The normativity of emotions is a widely discussed phenomenon. So far embodied accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the various aspects of the normativity of emotions. In this paper it shall be pointed out that embodied accounts are constrained in the way they can account for the normativity of emotions due to their commitments to naturalism, externalism, and anti-vehicle-internalism. One way to account for the normativity of emotions within a naturalist framework is to describe the intentional objects of emotions as affordances that are of value for the organism. These affordances are part of a biological and social environment we are situated in, and they stand in complex relations to each other and to skillful organisms. I suggest that describing these relations can replace vehicle-internalist approaches but still account for the normativity of emotions within a naturalist framework.

No abstract

No abstract

In this paper Ipresent William James'stheory of emotions and the central role it ascribes to the bodily reactions in emotions. Icall the claim that there is ad istinct pattern of bodilyr eactions that is constitutive for an emotion type the essential-ingredient view.Idiscuss some of the famous objections thatc ognitivists have raised against the feelingtheory and characterize the position that cognitivist accounts take with regard to bodilyr eactions in emotions as the coincidental-byproduct view.With regardt oc urrent empirical research from psy-chophysiologyIargue that the coincidental-byproduct view and the essential-ingredient view are both untenable. Yetthe Jamesianview can be understood in a broader context as not aiming to find essential ingredients of emotionsbut rather taking the bodilyarousal to be part of an organisms preparingfor action. Areinterpretation of James in this manner has alreadyb een presented by John Dewey,who also provides abroader framework to think of emotion and perception as being co-constituted by action-tendencies. 1J ames and the essential-ingredient view In his classic essay What is an Emotion? (1884), William James argues thatt he feeling of bodilya rousal is what constitutes an emotion. The commonsense view says that emotions simplycause bodilyarousal; when we are sad, we therefore start crying or when we feele mbarrassed, we blush. YetJ ames inverts the commonsense view and argues that in most cases we perceive something,l ike adangerous predator or an offensiveopponent,and this perception directlytriggers bodily arousal, which is felt and evaluated onlyafterwards. James'sc entral argument for this is of ap henomenological character:i fy ou imagine as trong emotion and try to subtract the feelingofall involved bodilysymptoms,nothing remains "but ac old and neutral mental state of intellectual perception" (James 1884,193). We can refert ot his argument as the "subtraction argument". Upon acloser look, however,James makes tworelated claims. The first claim is thatamental state that does not involvet he perception of bodily arousal would not be classified as an emotion at all. Thes econd claim is thatd ifferent kinds of emotions owe their special character to the different kindso fb odily arousal thatc onstitutet hem. Both claims are nicelyi llustrated in the following Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel

No abstract