Purpose -China holds a global monopoly of up to 97 percent for rare earth elements (REEs), which are indispensable for all kinds of twenty-first century high-tech applications. Since China has disrupted its exports and started discriminating between domestic and foreign demand, REEs have become a geostrategic resource. In March 2012, Japan, the USA and the European Union jointly filed a World Trade Organization dispute settlement case against China. The purpose of this paper is to elaborate why China implemented export quotas and tariffs on REEs and how the state is engaged in this sector domestically and abroad. Design/methodology/approach -The analysis frames China as a "competition state" and connects domestic with foreign economic policy on REEs. It uses data from Chinese official documents and non-Chinese sources. Findings -Better government control aims to consolidate the sector and lay the foundation for three other goals, namely: the establishment of integrated and innovative Chinese corporations that compete globally; the provision of incentives to attract high-tech foreign direct investment to China; and better environmental protection. China wants to climb the next step of the technological ladder to gain global economic leadership. Practical implications -Global environmental protection in mining is eased. However, non-Chinese market players can only take advantage of new business opportunities when the prices remain high. Since REEs are of strategic importance, rising political interference and raw materials diplomacy will continue to distort markets and price building. Originality/value -The paper connects domestic reregulation of China's rare earth sector with foreign policy goals (or "going in" and "going out") using the competition state approach.

China’s raw materials diplomacy and unregulated purchasing of minerals in Africa and Latin America, as well as its domestic raw materials export quota, have for years been eyed with suspicion by state and private actors. Industrialized countries want to uphold and extend free market access to raw materials, but also strengthen their political accountability and sustainability. However, critics argue that in contrast, China, the world’s largest metals and minerals trading power, has taken the opposite course, ignoring social and environmental standards, reinforcing authoritarian governments, and erecting trade barriers. China is faced with several interrelated challenges in its resource diplomacy and governance. This article claims that an identifiable, chronological connection and pattern has existed between China’s aid and investment diplomacy for resources since the late 1990s, free trade agreements since the 2000s, Beijing’s resource nationalism since the 2010s, and the reform process of national and privately organized transnational governance toward sustainability in the present day. Is China socializing with emerging transnational standards on mining and resource extraction in the developing world, and if so, why? This article argues that China’s raw materials governance, including corporate governance, has entered a phase of reform to pacify the external environment and to implement the Belt and Road Initiative. In theoretical terms, China’s raw materials governance will continue to emphasize neoliberal and neo-mercantilist goals, cushioned by globalist features.

No abstract

In 2003, the global toy industry started a new attempt to implement common standards on working conditions in the notorious ‘sweatshop‐factories’ especially in China, where up to three million people from rural provinces produce toys for Western brand name companies. This article explores, why and how the common industry code of conduct (CoC) of the International Council of the Toy Industries (ICTI) gathered momentum and who will benefit from this dynamic. One reason for this harmonization is the uncontrolled growth of unilateral CoC in the industry, that makes it impossible for suppliers to comply with all the requirements, particularly when they deliver to many different brand name companies. Credibility gaps of‐ and critical reports about the CoC‐record of major brand name companies like Disney, Mattel and Hasbro were continuously issued by Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs) from Hong Kong (the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, HKCIC), its Northern network partner, the German Catholic Organization Misereor under the umbrella of the ‘fair‐play’ campaign and, by several media reports in reputable newspapers in the USA. Since 2004, even Mattel as a widely acknowledged ambitious company on codes of conduct, supports the less ambitious sector code. Moreover, the ICTI CoC enjoys support from some big retailers like Karstadt‐Quelle, Argos and Woolworth, that give the industry code real authority within the industry. ICTI negotiates with the biggest toy retailers Toys'R'Us and Walmart to accept the code like their own. The coordination between the big retailers and the brand name companies can potentially end current weaknesses of single codes of conduct, that leaves the managerial thesis about ‘first‐mover‐advantages’ or reputation effects for the brand name companies as a myth. In the long run, the major brand companies may benefit of a better reputation of the whole industry, due to the fact that the image of a brand is strongly connected with the image of the whole sector. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The European Union’s (EU’s) Taiwan policies have been dominated by trade and economic concerns due to the absence of a security profile and China’s insistence on Taiwan belonging to China. This neglect of a political role of the EU in East Asia is often regarded as a central strategic weakness of the EU. With a new government in office in Taiwan since 2016, Cross-Strait relations have worsened; this challenges EU’s ambitions to become a strategic actor in the region. Apart from security and economy, other political aspects of bilateral relations have remained almost unnoticed in the literature. This article addresses EU’s Taiwan policies from a different perspective. Instead of a hierarchic foreign policy exploration with security issues predominating, here, a multidimensional mosaic of EU’s Taiwan relations is analysed breadthways. From this standpoint, one can see that EU’s profile in Taiwan has increased considerably in recent years. These broadened bilateral relations may also support the EU’s wider political and strategic interests in the region altogether. The EU could help Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy align with EU’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations strategy, and thus support a rule-based strategy in the Far East.