No abstract

RESUMO: Durante a ditadura de Pinochet, profundas reformas foram implementadas no Chile. Certamente, muitos delas constituíam conquistas permanentes para estratégias do desenvolvimento da democracia. No entanto, o crescimento econômico entre 1973 e 1989 foi medíocre (com média de apenas 2,9% ao ano) e a distribuição de renda deteriorou-se notavelmente. Isso estava relacionado ao fato de que as reformas sofreram várias falhas que tiveram graves repercussões no crescimento do PIB potencial e no bem-estar social. Nos anos 90, os governos da Concertación lançaram várias reformas das reformas com o objetivo de injetar "pragmatismo". Concentrou-se na diminuição da vulnerabilidade macroeconômica quando confrontada com um ambiente externo cada vez mais volátil e na conclusão de mercados domésticos subdesenvolvidos. O resultado do conjunto de reformas das reformas foi que, durante toda a década, houve uma expansão vigorosa sem precedentes da capacidade produtiva (em média 7% ao ano), juntamente com uma redução significativa na pobreza (de 45% para 21% da população). Uma lacuna recessiva em 1999-2001, no entanto, destacou falhas, crescentes contradições e a falta de maiores reformas nas reformas. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Desarrollo; sostenibilidad; ciclo económico; inversión; distribución del ingresso; Chile.

Towards the end of the 1980s, private capital inflows began to return to Latin America (see Calvo et al., 1993; Ffrench-Davis and Griffith-Jones, 1995; and Ocampo, 1994). Chile was one of the first countries to attract the renewed flows of foreign capital, and one that faced the largest supply, in relation to its size. The reversal of the drought in capital inflows of the 1980s undoubtedly had positive effects. It relaxed the binding foreign exchange constraint under which most countries labored during the debt crisis. However, both the large magnitude of the new capital flows and their composition prone to volatility have caused problems for which the recipient countries have been, by and large, ill-prepared. In the first place, there is the problem of domestic absorption. If they are to contribute to long-term development, capital inflows should lead to a significant increase in the investment rate, something which, with the exception of Chile, has not taken place in most countries in the region. In Chile, it will be argued that one reason for the greater degree of success in channeling foreign capital to investment has been the discouragement of short-term flows and the large share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in capital inflows in the 1990s. The Chilean experience does indeed suggest that, when capital inflows take the form of FDI, there is a greater likelihood that the investment rate will rise than when foreign capital is in more liquid or short-term forms.

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Since the 1970s, Chile has exhibited a highly skewed income distribution accompanied with strong fluctuations over time. Although income distribution worsened notably in the 1970s-80s, a significant improvement was recorded in the first half of the 1990s, resulting from better economic and social policies in the return to democracy. Nonetheless, Chile still faces significant challenges to improve development. There must be an active macroeconomic policy focused on the real economy. Chile also needs profound microeconomic reforms, including (i) capital markets, developing long-term financing channels for small businesses; (ii) radical progress in quality of education and labour training; and (iii) vigorous public support for innovation.