http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=bjn Repository Use PolicyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit purposes providing that:• The full-text is not changed in any way The long-term physiological effects of refined carbohydrates on appetite and mood remain unclear. Reported effects when subjects are not blind may be due to expectations and have rarely been studied for more than 24 h. The present study compared the effects of supplementary soft drinks added to the diet over 4 weeks on dietary intake, mood and BMI in normal-weight women (n 133). Subjects were categorised as 'watchers' or 'non-watchers' of what they ate then received sucrose or artificially sweetened drinks (4 £ 250 ml per d). Expectancies were varied by labelling drinks 'sugar' or 'diet' in a counter-balanced design. Sucrose supplements provided 1800 kJ per d and sweetener supplements provided 67 kJ per d. Food intake was measured with a 7 d diary and mood with ten single Likert scales. By 4 weeks, sucrose supplements significantly reduced total carbohydrate intake (F(1,129) ¼ 53·81; P,0·001), fat (F(2,250) ¼ 33·33; P,0·001) and protein intake (F(2,250) ¼ 28·04; P, 0·001) compared with sweetener supplements. Mean daily energy intake increased by just under 1000 kJ compared with baseline (t (67 df) ¼ 3·82; P, 0·001) and was associated with a non-significant trend for those receiving sucrose to gain weight. There were no effects on appetite or mood. Neither dietary restraint status as measured by the Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire nor the expectancy procedure had effects. Expectancies influenced mood only during baseline week. It is concluded that sucrose satiates, rather than stimulates, appetite or negative mood in normal-weight subjects.

Objective To investigate the relation between older patients' assessments of the quality of their primary care and measures of good clinical practice on the basis of data from administrative and clinical records. Design Cross sectional population based study using the general practice assessment survey. Setting 18 general practices in the Basildon primary care trust area, south east England. Participants 3487 people aged 65 or more. Main outcome measures Correlations between mean practice scores on the general practice assessment survey and three evidence based measures on survey of case records (monitoring for, and control of, hypertension, and vaccination against influenza). Results 76% of people (3487/4563) responded to the general practice assessment survey. Correlations between patient assessed survey scores for technical quality and the objective records based measures of good clinical practice were 0.22 (95% confidence interval − 0.28 to 0.62) for hypertension monitored, 0.30 ( − 0.19 to 0.67) for hypertension controlled, and − 0.05 ( − 0.50 to 0.43) for influenza vaccination. Conclusions Older patients' assessments are not a sufficient basis for assessing the technical quality of their primary care. For an overall assessment both patient based and records based measures are required.

The implications for addiction research of recent knowledge about human memory are described. It is important that research using self-reported data understands the limits of such data. The nature of human memory and the selective, constructive processes of remembering provide one set of limits. Abandoning retrospective data entirely is not feasible in addiction research, for it would require the abandonment of current and prospective self-reported data as well, as they are also subject to memory biases. Because of memory distortions, self-reports, even by rigorous questionnaire, are biased narratives rather than incomplete but otherwise accurate evocations of past events. These limits necessitate caution and humility in the interpretation of findings, and cannot be eliminated by any particular set of research methods. There will never be a philosophers' stone which will convert self-reported data into absolutely accurate figures of quantity, frequency and timing. Nor is it straightforward to infer social and psychological causality from the organization and timing of events as remembered.

Unconscious transference refers to an eyewitness's misidentification of an innocent bystander for a criminal perpetrator because of the witness's exposure to the bystander in another context. In a series of five field studies involving 330 retail store clerks and 340 students, five retention intervals from 2 hours to 2 weeks, seven bystander-perpetrator intervals from 2 minutes to 2 weeks, three line-up types, two levels of line-up similarity, four different bystanders and four different targets, with one exception no evidence was obtained that could be interpreted to demonstrate the phenomenon of unconscious transference.That is, theresultsrepeatedly failed to reveal more misidentifications of an innocent bystander by witnesses who had been previously exposed to the bystander than by control eyewitnesses who had not. To the contrary, the prior observation of the bystander often served to reduce the frequency of misidentification. In the final experiment the kind of misidentification error referred to as unconscious transference did occur, but only within a particular combination of bystander-perpetrator similarity and line-up construction: a combination that, in conjunction with the kind of event used, seems unlikely in real-world settings. Nevertheless, the inclusion of a familiar face in the line-ups often altered witnesses' choices in such a way that choosing someone was more likely when the lineup included a familiar face than when it did not. Finally, in contrast to the current explanations of unconscious transference, it is argued that it may not be a sense of familiarity with the bystander that is the basis of misidentifications; rather, it may also include incorrect inferences about the likelihood that the bystander might be the perpetrator.

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