Following Hermann von Helmholtz, who described visual perceptions as unconscious inferences from sensory data and knowledge derived from the past, perceptions are regarded as similar to predictive hypotheses of science, but are psychologically projected into external space and accepted as our most immediate reality. There are increasing discrepancies between perceptions and conceptions with science's advances, which makes it hard to define ‘illusion’. Visual illusions can provide evidence of object knowledge and working rules for vision, but only when the phenomena are explained and classified. A tentative classification is presented, in terms of appearances and kinds of causes. The large contribution of knowledge from the past for vision raises the issue: how do we recognize the present, without confusion from the past. This danger is generally avoided as the present is signalled by real–time sensory inputs— perhaps flagged by qualia of consciousness.

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Patients with scotomas or blind-spots in their visual field resulting from damage to the visual pathways often report that the pattern from the rest of the visual field 'fills in' to occupy the scotoma. Here we describe a novel technique for generating an artificial perceptual scotoma which enabled us to study the spatial and temporal characteristics of this filling-in process. A homogeneous grey square subtending 1.5 degrees was displayed against a background of twinkling two-dimensional noise of equal mean luminance. On steady eccentric fixation for 10 s the square vanished and was filled in by the twinkling noise from the surround. Using this display we found that 'filling in' is an active visual process that probably involves creating an actual neural representation of the surround rather than merely ignoring the absence of information from the scotoma; filling in can occur separately for colour and texture, suggesting separate mechanisms; the filling-in process does not completely suppress information from the scotoma, even after an image has faded completely from consciousness it can nevertheless contribute to motion perception; and the process can be strongly influenced by illusory contours.

Perceptions may be compared with hypotheses in science. The methods of acquiring scientific knowledge provide a working paradigm for investigating processes of perception. Much as the information channels of instruments, such as radio telescopes, transmit signals which are processed according to various assumptions to give useful data, so neural signals are processed to give data for perception. To understand perception, the signal codes and the stored knowledge or assumptions used for deriving perceptual hypotheses must be discovered. Systematic perceptual errors are important clues for appreciating signal channel limitations, and for discovering hypothesis-generating procedures. Although this distinction between 'physiological' and 'cognitive' aspects of perception may be logically clear, it is in practice surprisingly difficult to establish which are responsible even for clearly established phenomena such as the classical distortion illusions. Experimental results are presented, aimed at distinguishing between and disconvering what happens when there is mismatch with the neural signal channel, and when neural signals are processed inappropriately for the current situation. This leads us to make some distinctions between perceptual and scientific hypotheses, which raise in a new form the problem: What are 'objects'?