A revolution occurred within the psychiatric profession in the early 1980s that rapidly transformed the theory and practice of mental health in the United States. In a very short period of time, mental illnesses were transformed from broad, etiologically defined entities that were continuous with normality to symptom-based, categorical diseases. The third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) was responsible for this change. The paradigm shift in mental health diagnosis in the DSM-III was neither a product of growing scientific knowledge nor of increasing medicalization. Instead, its symptom-based diagnoses reflect a growing standardization of psychiatric diagnoses. This standardization was the product of many factors, including: (1) professional politics within the mental health community, (2) increased government involvement in mental health research and policymaking, (3) mounting pressure on psychiatrists from health insurers to demonstrate the effectiveness of their practices, and (4) the necessity of pharmaceutical companies to market their products to treat specific diseases. This article endeavors to explain the origins of DSM-III, the political struggles that generated it, and its long-term consequences for clinical diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders in the United States.

A key issue in the decades-long struggle over US health care spending is how to distribute liability for expenses across all market participants, from insurers to providers. The rise and abandonment in the 1990s of capitation payments-lump-sum, per person payments to health care providers to provide all care for a specified individual or group-offers a stark example of how difficult it is for providers to assume meaningful financial responsibility for patient care. This article chronicles the expansion and decline of the capitation model in the 1990s. We offer lessons learned and assess the extent to which these lessons have been applied in the development of contemporary forms of provider cost sharing, particularly accountable care organizations, which in effect constitute a search for the "sweet spot," or appropriate place on a spectrum, between providers and payers with respect to the degree of risk they absorb.

Our analysis of the DEA's ARCOS data shows that most of the significant variables correlated with 'higher' per-capita use of ADHD drugs serve as a proxy for county affluence. To provide a more complex, multivariate analysis of the area variation in psychostimulant use across the U.S.-which is the logical next step-requires obtaining price data to match the DEA's quantity data.

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