We examined 2 mechanisms of change under paradoxical interventions: reactance and increased sense of self-efficacy. Procrastinating college students were randomly assigned to either paradoxical or self-control interventions. Effective study time and perceived self-efficacy were measured before and after treatment. In Study 1 nonverbal measure of initial reactance was employed. In Study 2 reactance was experimentally manipulated. Under paradoxical interventions, Ss higher on initial reactance benefited more from therapy than did Ss with low reactance; nonreactant Ss did not increase their effective study time, but they did improve in perceived efficacy to control their procrastination; increased study time was negatively correlated with increased self-efficacy. In self-control treatment, increased study time was accompanied by increased self-efficacy. Paradoxical interventions seem to reduce procrastination through the mechanism of reactance in some clients, whereas in others they lead to a cognitive change, possibly mediating a subsequent behavior change. The term paradoxical interventions refers to a wide variety of therapeutic injunctions and directives, the common denominator of which is essentially their attempt to induce change by discouraging it (Seltzer, 1986). Although there are enthusiastic clinical reports attesting to the efficacy of all types of paradoxical interventions, empirical evidence from controlled studies indicates that there are vast differences in the efficacy of different types of paradoxical interventions (see Shoham-Salomon & Rosenthal. 1987, for a review). Moreover, the differential psychological factors that mediate the effects of paradoxical interventions were rarely investigated in a controlled way. In one of the first attempts to understand how paradoxical interventions operate, Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) explicated the logic of what they called the therapeutic double bind. It was seen as a mirror image of the pathogenic double bind: The directive to deliberately engage in the symptomatic behavior, the very same behavior the client wishes to change, is similar to a "be spontaneous" paradox. The only way to obey such a directive is by disobeying it. According to Watzlawick et al. (1967), two possible consequences follow a paradoxical directive (e.g., to bring about one's anxiety). In many cases the client is not able to produce such a spontaneous occurrence on demand. In each attempt to bring the symptom about, he or she will experience reduced symptomatology. Such a success is expected to lead to a sense of controllability, a feeling of mastery We thank Hal Arkowitz and the three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this article. We also thank Anat Goren-Falach and Eyal Dahari for their tremendous amount of help at all stages of this research.

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