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Her academic career was relatively brief-from 1966 through 1986-but her contributions have lasting impact. Marjorie Lansing developed the "gender gap" concept and helped popularize the term with her path-breaking dissertation research that became the basis for Women

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A critical point in a theory of political obligation is individual judgment as to whether the limits of the obligation are reached. This is a problem of evaluation: when and under what conditions an individual can judge the status of his political obligation (even whether he has an obligation); how, with what form of expression, he can act on his evaluation; whether indeed, theoretically speaking, such judgmental activity is permissible. And when public goods and political organizations are defined and justified in terms of individuals' needs, wants, or rights, consent must be integral to theorists' arguments about authority, legitimacy, and obligation. 1 Consent, however, may be used in different ways; and even theorists most commonly cited in support of dissent (a "negative" form of evaluation), for example, often have developed theoretical models which in fact systematically preclude this evaluative activity. This may be expected with theorists who are thought to be "conservative." It is often surprising with "liberal" theorists, but it is not inexplicable. Contemporary analysts of past, and sometimes paradigmatic, theorists must pursue one (or both) of two tasks: they must examine the different ways in which concepts, say, consent, are used by both theorist and analyst (implicitly concepts often are used by the analyst differently than by the theorist); and they must analyse how a theorist's argument unfolds and how different parts complement and support one another rather than relying on one or two isolated citations (perhaps believed typical) to infer that a theorist does in fact take a particular position -e.g., a position supporting dissent. This paper analyses the problem of individual evaluation or judgment of political obligation in the Two Treatises of John Locke, who traditionally is considered to be the leading exponent of the liberal theory of consent. 2 As is well known,

Theodore Lowi's proposal for juridical democracy is inspired by a "crisis in authority" that has been generated under "interest-group liberalism," his designation for con temporary pluralist theory. Lowi suggests that the roots of the crisis lie in the pluralists' misreading of the Madisonian model. Juridical democracy is an alternative analytical and programmatic format which is designed to reintroduce the now lost benefits of the Madisonian model. Lowi's approach demonstrates, in contrast to interest-group liberal ism, that government coercion is essential and advantages some groups over others, and it provides a vehicle for testing whether consensus about public values exists. Both approaches accept "interests" as the basic unit of analysis, but neither affords criteria for assessing them. Interests make claims which are undemocratic, inegalitarian, and the like. Lacking evaluative criteria, both positions resort to social and institutional regularities and procedures as the essence of democracy.