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A cross-generational procedure was used to compare power relationships described by E. R, Service and R. L. Carneiro in their theories of social evolution. Every 20 minutes one member of each of three 4-person groups was removed and a new member added, for a total of nine generations. In all conditions the groups produced products that could eventually be exchanged for money. In the Service condition the products were retained or traded, and one group, Group B, was advantaged in terms of its centrality in the communication network, the diversity of its products, and the value of its products. In the Carneiro condition Group B was additionally advantaged by being able to confiscate the products produced by the two other groups, A and C. Comparison of the Service and Carneiro conditions thus involved a comparison of two types of power: mutual behavior control and fate control. The results indicated that although in both conditions Group B was perceived as the overall leader, total production was greater in the Service condition than in the Carneiro condition. This was true for Groups A and C and, consistent with an idle-rich hypothesis, was also true for Group B. Further results revealed interesting sex differences for the A and C groups within the Carneiro condition. The women engaged in less active resistance to Group B's power and developed a weaker seniority norm for in-group leadership.The present research has two general pur-then the more abstract concern with power poses. The first is to investigate the differ-mechanisms. ential effects of trading and confiscatory re-According to Service (1975), the first step lations between open groups. The second is on the social-evolutionary ladder results from to examine the differential consequences of an attempt by small bands, or villages, to the models, or theories, of social evolution manage problems of redistribution of goods proposed by Service (1975) and by Carneiro and services. Three such villages (A, B, and (1970). The latter purpose requires that we C) develop a more complex society, with one simulate generational transition in undevel-of the villages (B) being dominant, if three oped societies, whereas the former simply conditions exist. First, B must have both requires that we establish certain power re-more desirable goods and a greater range of lations between open groups. We will first goods. Second, B must be central in the cornconsider the social-evolutionary concern and munication network so that A and C can only trade via B. Third, there must be a circumscription of the three villages so that it is more This research was part of a larger project supported advantageous to reach a mutual accommo-Sc * nce Fo «n datioi » Gran <-#B T N . S dation than to leave the general area. SS£%SS 'hi Carneiro (1970) argues that military sub-

No abstract

After a systematic national search, we found that 86 special education doctoral programs were active in 1999. Our search found that five programs had closed in recent years, but six new programs were in the planning process. Additional programs were identified, but they are best described as emphasis areas (possibly minor areas of concentration) administered by other departments or programs typically housed in colleges of education (e.g., educational leadership, curriculum and instruction, early childhood). Administrators of identified doctoral programs were surveyed to determine enrollment, graduate rates, program content, and means of student recruitment. Possibly some of the most revealing findings from this component of the larger Faculty Study found that: (a) most special education doctoral programs are underenrolled, (b) doctoral students' enrollment has declined 30% over the last 20 years, and (c) programs are not highly selective. Unless deliberate actions are taken, the supply from special education doctoral programs will not increase and the demand for leadership personnel, particularly for faculty who work in academe, will not be met.