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A cross-generational procedure was used to compare power relationships described by E. R, Service and R. L. Carneiro in their theories of social evolution. Every 20 minutes one member of each of three 4-person groups was removed and a new member added, for a total of nine generations. In all conditions the groups produced products that could eventually be exchanged for money. In the Service condition the products were retained or traded, and one group, Group B, was advantaged in terms of its centrality in the communication network, the diversity of its products, and the value of its products. In the Carneiro condition Group B was additionally advantaged by being able to confiscate the products produced by the two other groups, A and C. Comparison of the Service and Carneiro conditions thus involved a comparison of two types of power: mutual behavior control and fate control. The results indicated that although in both conditions Group B was perceived as the overall leader, total production was greater in the Service condition than in the Carneiro condition. This was true for Groups A and C and, consistent with an idle-rich hypothesis, was also true for Group B. Further results revealed interesting sex differences for the A and C groups within the Carneiro condition. The women engaged in less active resistance to Group B's power and developed a weaker seniority norm for in-group leadership.The present research has two general pur-then the more abstract concern with power poses. The first is to investigate the differ-mechanisms. ential effects of trading and confiscatory re-According to Service (1975), the first step lations between open groups. The second is on the social-evolutionary ladder results from to examine the differential consequences of an attempt by small bands, or villages, to the models, or theories, of social evolution manage problems of redistribution of goods proposed by Service (1975) and by Carneiro and services. Three such villages (A, B, and (1970). The latter purpose requires that we C) develop a more complex society, with one simulate generational transition in undevel-of the villages (B) being dominant, if three oped societies, whereas the former simply conditions exist. First, B must have both requires that we establish certain power re-more desirable goods and a greater range of lations between open groups. We will first goods. Second, B must be central in the cornconsider the social-evolutionary concern and munication network so that A and C can only trade via B. Third, there must be a circumscription of the three villages so that it is more This research was part of a larger project supported advantageous to reach a mutual accommo-Sc * nce Fo «n datioi » Gran <-#B T N . S dation than to leave the general area. SS£%SS 'hi Carneiro (1970) argues that military sub-

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An experiment was conducted in which information regarding a target person's evaluation ofa target object was presented either in written form or via video tape, and information regarding the evaluations of four other people was also presented either in written fonn or via video tape. The results indicated that the effect of consensus on both person and object attribution was significantly weaker when the target-person information was video taped (concrete) and the other-people information was written (abstract) than in the other three conditions created by the combination of the two informational variables. It is argued that, in contrast to earlier speculation in the literature, type of consensus and its mode of presentation represent conceptually orthogonal dimensions. Further research is urged to map out the boundary conditions of consensus information; it is demonstrated that current work has largely concentrated upon only a portion of this attributional domain due to the prevalent confounding of these two independent dimensions.