Popular induction: When is consensus information informative?1

Solomón, Michael R.; Drenan, Sarah; Insko, Chester A.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1981.tb00738.x

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Their findings and ours challenge the claim (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975;Nisbett et al, 1976) that relatively pallid consensus information is always overwhelmed by individuals' vivid memories of their own past histories and other relevant information when they make predictions about their own behavior. Our conclusion on this point is consistent with other literature questioning the supposedly stronger impact of more vivid stimuli on judgment processes (e.g., Collins, Taylor, Wood, & Thompson, 1988) and with literature questioning the claim that base-rate information is inherently less vivid than individuating information (Solomon, Drenan, & Insko, 1981).…”

Section: Self-protective Biases and Consensus Information Usesupporting

confidence: 91%

Self-monitoring and self-protective biases in use of consensus information to predict one's own behavior.

Krosnick¹,

Sedikides²

1990

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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It is often important and useful for people to predict their own behavior in novel situations. Although theory suggests that such predictions should be based at least in part on consensus information, some past research in this area suggests that people ignore it. Previous investigators have argued that, instead of using consensus information, people predict their own behavior on the basis of their personal histories. Two studies reported in this article demonstrate that people are willing to make use of consensus information in predicting their own behavior. However, self-monitoring is found to regulate consensus information use. High self-monitors are more responsive to complimentary consensus information than are low self-monitors, and low self-monitors are more responsive to threatening consensus information than are high self-monitors. The use of base-rate information in statistical reasoning processes has been of interest to psychologists for many years, due in part to Kahneman and Tversky's (1972, 1973, 1984) interest in people's appreciation of statistical rules and laws and to Kelley's (1967) interest in processes by which people make attributions regarding the causes of behavior. Early research on the use of base-rate information suggested that people either ignore it or vastly underuse it. However, more recent research has shown that people often use base-rate information to make judgments but that its influence is greater under some circumstances than under others (for reviews, see Borgida & Brekke, 1981; Kassin, 1979). People are more responsive to base-rate information derived from a representative sample than they are to information based on an unrepresentative sample (Wells & Harvey, 1977). Base-rate information has more effect when it is encountered after other sorts of competing information than when it is encountered before such information (Ruble & Feldman, 1976; Zuckerman, 1978). People make more use of base-rate information when they bring a scientific judgmental orientation to a problem than when they bring a clinical orientation (Zukier & Pepitone, 1984). Finally, people are more responsive to baserate information if inferential rules suggesting the use of base rates have been activated (Ginossar & Trope, 1987). Thus, it

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Section: Self-protective Biases and Consensus Information Usesupporting

confidence: 91%

Self-monitoring and self-protective biases in use of consensus information to predict one's own behavior.

Krosnick¹,

Sedikides²

1990

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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“…For example, M. R. Solomon et al (1981) provided evidence that type of consensus and its mode of presentation represent orthogonal dimensions that affect the impact of consen sus on attributions. In a useful review, Kassin (1979) suggested that consensus effects depend upon such mediating factors as: the strength of magnitude of the base rate information, the salience ofthe information and the ease with which it may be applied, the perceived representativeness (and hence generalizability of the base rate sample), and the causal relevance of the base rate .…”

Section: Consensusmentioning

confidence: 97%

Current Issues in Attribution Theory and Research

Harvey¹,

Weary²

1984

Annu. Rev. Psychol.

255

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“…Base-rate neglect is most likely to occur to the extent that base-rate information is abstract and pallid, whereas case information is concrete and vivid (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Solomon, Drenan, & Insko, 1981). In the situation we are studying, in which a person receives aggregate information in the presence of a coactor, we thought it quite likely that vivid information from the coactor would have a greater effect on self-evaluations than would pallid information from the average of a remote sample.…”

Section: The Diagnostic Value Of Individual and Aggregate Data Sourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The influence of individual versus aggregate social comparison and the presence of others on self-evaluations.

Buckingham¹,

Alicke²

2002

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

108

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In 5 studies, the authors investigated the effects of comparison with an individual versus comparison with the statistical average on self-evaluations of performance and ability. In Studies 1 and 2, participants took a test of lie detection ability and were provided with the average score and the score of an individual coactor. Both types of feedback significantly affected self-evaluations of performance, but only comparison with the coactor significantly affected self-evaluations of ability. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that the presence of a coactor moderated the effect of aggregate social comparison on self-evaluations of ability. The results provide preliminary support for the contention that minimizing the impact of comparison with the average is a self-serving strategy that is facilitated by the presence of others.

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Popular induction: When is consensus information informative?1

Cited by 7 publications

References 24 publications

Self-monitoring and self-protective biases in use of consensus information to predict one's own behavior.

Self-monitoring and self-protective biases in use of consensus information to predict one's own behavior.

Current Issues in Attribution Theory and Research

The influence of individual versus aggregate social comparison and the presence of others on self-evaluations.

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