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The literature on welfare chauvinism suggests that dominant majorities are less likely to support redistribution across identity lines. To encourage support, scholarship recommends designing policies universally and signaling beneficiary deservingness. However, policies that support disadvantaged groups cannot always be designed universally. Moreover, dominant groups often hold minoritized groups to a deservingness double standard. Thus, we ask, what are effective ways to increase support for out-group redistribution? We argue that distributive justice principles—justifications for who should get what and why—can bolster support for out-group redistributive policies. We test this argument through three experiments in Slovakia, with the Roma as the out-group. Majority Slovaks support policies predicated on the principle of reciprocity—with benefits conditional on contribution. Unconditional policies and policies that are motivated by the need principle garner minority Roma support. Given salient anti-Roma prejudice, we consider our findings a floor. For less stigmatized out-groups, reciprocity-based policies may further bolster support.

Why do voters in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) vote for Euroskeptic political parties? Existing explanations of Euroskepticism suggest that those benefiting economically due to the European Union (EU) are less likely to be Euroskeptic. These approaches fail to take into account the social purpose of EU economic transfers. I argue that the minority advancement realized through EU funding drives voters toward Euroskeptic electoral options. I provide evidence of this relationship through two methods: a large-N statistical analysis and a survey experiment. The large-N analysis employs time-series, regional data from ten CEE member states. The survey experiment tests the hypothesis with a nationally representative sample of the Slovak population. Results from both methods corroborate the hypothesized relationship. Importantly, results suggest that reactionary voters may undermine the long-term institutional goals of the EU due to the short-term consequences of EU policies.

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Why do individuals in Central and Eastern Europe support parties and candidates that hold restrictive positions on migration? I argue that the mobilization of public opinion against the European integration of external migration management is a cause. To test, I employ an experiment in Slovakia that combines a between-subjects experiment with a candidate-choice conjoint. Results indicate strong support for restrictive migration policies generally and that ideology moderates reactions to messages about European Union influence. In response to these messages, liberals shift toward restrictive policy preferences; conservatives do not. These differential effects suggest that messages about European Union influence run up against ceiling effects, where entrenched anti-migration preferences prevent attitudinal change. This paper identifies the limited set of conditions under which the mobilization of public opinion against European integration influences attitudes and electoral preferences.