The molar spin susceptibilities χ(T ) of Na-TCNQ, K-TCNQ and Rb-TCNQ(II) are fit quantitatively to 450 K in terms of half-filled bands of three one-dimensional Hubbard models with extended interactions using exact results for finite systems. All three models have bond order wave (BOW) and charge density wave (CDW) phases with boundary V = Vc(U ) for nearest-neighbor interaction V and on-site repulsion U . At high T , all three salts have regular stacks of TCNQ − anion radicals. The χ(T ) fits place Na and K in the CDW phase and Rb(II) in the BOW phase with V ≈ Vc. The Na and K salts have dimerized stacks at T < T d while Rb(II) has regular stacks at 100K. The χ(T ) analysis extends to dimerized stacks and to dimerization fluctuations in Rb(II). The three models yield consistent values of U , V and transfer integrals t for closely related TCNQ − stacks. Model parameters based on χ(T ) are smaller than those from optical data that in turn are considerably reduced by electronic polarization from quantum chemical calculation of U , V and t on adjacent TCNQ − ions. The χ(T ) analysis shows that fully relaxed states have reduced model parameters compared to optical or vibration spectra of dimerized or regular TCNQ − stacks.

Climate change adaptation technologies (CCATs) have become an important tool for farmers to cope with climate change and address the risks of natural disasters, but in many rural areas, there is still a reliance on traditional agricultural techniques. It is necessary to explore the incentives for promoting CCATs in agriculture, and the conditions for the effectiveness and realization of policy measures. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model to analyze the behaviour of local governments and farmers in promoting CCATs. Our findings are as follows: Under certain conditions, the evolutionary game of promoting CCATs in agriculture can achieve equilibrium. Within a certain range, the incentive for farmers to choose to adopt CCATs increases with local governments’ risk subsidy and cost-sharing. When the subsidy is too high, local governments may choose the no- promotion strategy, under which the policy incentive disappears, reducing the incentive for farmers to adopt CCATs. Publicity is an important incentive for promoting CCATs, and its effect is evident. Our findings provide insights into the development of policies to promote CCATs in agriculture.

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