Past research on pricing in imperfectly competitive markets conventionally assumes that competition operates through a specific quantity or a price game. However, most markets do not function in a manner consistent with a single static benchmark. Methods to overcome this problem have largely been rejected by the research community (i.e., conjectural variations). The primary objective of our research is to introduce a new methodology for measuring imperfect competition under product differentiation in consumer goods.We develop the empirical procedures for estimating a competitive toughness model as proposed by d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet. This approach presents a theoretically grounded procedure that measures market power in an empirically tractable framework. We estimate the proposed model on the retail market for ground coffee. Our results suggest that market power is understated in a model that imposes the restriction of Bertrand pricing.The results suggest that this could be a promising approach for use in many applications. [EconLit citations: D43, L13, K21]

No abstract

Although existing studies have suggested that men's leave‐taking positively affects children's development and their involvement in childcare and household chores in the long run, the underlying mechanism remains unclear. To shed light on this ambiguity, this study develops a dynamic collective household model and analyses household decisions on parental leave‐sharing between spouses, resource allocation, home production, and labour supply. We demonstrate that gender equality in bargaining positions within families before leave‐taking is crucial in explaining the positive impacts of men's leave‐taking. Specifically, if women's intrahousehold bargaining power before taking parental leave is sufficiently low, their husbands are unlikely to take leave, and women's positions may deteriorate after leave. Consequently, households may allocate fewer resources to children, and men may not actively participate in childcare and household chores. Our model suggests that implementing parental leave policies for both genders may not be sufficient; simultaneous measures to increase women's bargaining power are necessary to encourage men to take parental leave and maximize the policies' benefits.

No abstract