This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with productive government spending. In this model, the government can finance its costs through income tax and government debt and has a target level of government debt relative to the size of the economy. We show that there are two steady states. One is associated with high growth and the other with low growth. It is also shown that whether the government uses income taxes or government bonds makes the results differ significantly. In particular, an increase in government bonds reduces the growth rate in the high-growth steady state and raises the growth rate in the low-growth steady state. Conversely, an increase in the income tax rate reduces the growth rate in the low-growth steady state and there exists some tax rate that maximizes the growth rate in the high-growth steady state. Finally, the level of welfare in the low-growth steady state is lower than that in the high-growth steady state.

We extend the Barro (1990) model of endogenous growth to a two-sector one which consists of pure consumption and investment goods. It is possible that the extended version has a unique balanced growth rate such that for given initial values of state variables, (i) the extended model economy grows at the unique rate right from the beginning or (ii) it has a continuum of equilibrium paths whose growth rates commonly converge to the balanced growth rate. That is, unlike the original one-sector model, it has transitional dynamics in case (ii). We also show that the effects of small changes in some parameters on the balanced growth rate and the price of the consumption good in terms of the investment good are opposite between (i) and (ii).

Constructing a two-sector small open endogenous growth model with productive government spending, this paper examines patterns of specialization and the growth effects of fiscal policy. It is shown in this model that a change in income tax rate can cause a change in an equilibrium pattern of specialization. Because of this property, the relationship between the tax rate and the growth rate yields either a humped shape or a two-humped shape, depending on world commodity prices. We also show that the growth maximizing tax rate is not necessarily equal to the tax rate that maximizes the level of social welfare.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Asian Development Bank InstituteThe Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI's working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. Koichi Futagami: futagami@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp Koichi Futagami is a professor at Osaka University in Osaka, Japan. Takeo Hori is a lecturer at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. Ryoji Ohdoi is an associate professor at Osaka City University in Osaka, Japan.The views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building 8F 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100-6008, JapanTel:+81-3-3593-5500 Fax:+81-3-3593-5571 URL:www.adbi.org E-mail: info@adbi.org AbstractIn this paper, we examine the effects of introducing constraints on government borrowing using a continuous-time overlapping generations model of a small open economy. We consider government placing constraints on the amount of government bonds outstanding by establishing an upper limit, or target level, for the ratio of government bonds to gross domestic product. We first show that there exist multiple steady states in the model small open economy. One is a steady state with high growth, the other a steady state with low growth. We next examine how changes in the target level for bonds affect economic growth rates at the steady states. If the economy has a positive amount of asset holdings, we obtain the following results. When the government runs budget surpluses, an increase in the target level for government bonds reduces the growth rate of the low-growth economy, but raises the growth rate of the high-growth economy. However, when the government runs budget deficits, an increase in the target level for government bonds raises the growth rate of the low-growth economy, but reduces the growth rate of ...

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with technology choice and credit market imperfections, in order to investigate a possible source of underdevelopment. The model shows that a better financial infrastructure that provides stronger enforcement of contracts facilitates the development of financial markets, which, in turn, enables firms to switch to more productive and capital-intensive technologies, thereby promoting economic development. In the presence of credit rationing, however, this technological switch widens inequality. Therefore, risk-averse agents would not be willing to improve the financial infrastructure to the level at which the technological switch occurs, resulting in a development trap. A remedy is to facilitate small firms' adoption of the currently used technology rather than the new one.