This paper analyzes a single-machine scheduling problem with family setup times both from an optimization and a cost allocation perspective. In a so-called family sequencing situation jobs are processed on a single machine, there is an initial processing order on the jobs, and every job within a family has an identical cost function that depends linearly on its completion time. Moreover, a job does not require a setup when preceded by another job from the same family while a family specific setup time is required when a job follows a member of some other family.Explicitly taking into account admissibility restrictions due to the presence of the initial order, we show that for any subgroup of jobs there is an optimal order, such that all jobs of the same family are processed consecutively. To analyze the allocation problem of the maximal cost savings of the whole group of jobs, we define and analyze a so-called corresponding cooperative family sequencing game which explicitly takes into account the maximal cost savings for any coalition of jobs. Using nonstandard techniques we prove that each family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a particular marginal vector belongs to the core. Finally, we specifically analyze the case in which the initial order is family ordered.

No abstract

This paper analyzes a single-machine scheduling problem with family setup times both from an optimization and a cost allocation perspective. In a so-called family sequencing situation jobs are processed on a single machine, there is an initial processing order on the jobs, and every job within a family has an identical cost function that depends linearly on its completion time. Moreover, a job does not require a setup when preceded by another job from the same family while a family specific setup time is required when a job follows a member of some other family. Explicitly taking into account admissibility restrictions due to the presence of the initial order, we show that for any subgroup of jobs there is an optimal order, such that all jobs of the same family are processed consecutively. To analyze the allocation problem of the maximal cost savings of the whole group of jobs, we define and analyze a so-called corresponding cooperative family sequencing game which explicitly takes into account the maximal cost savings for any coalition of jobs. Using nonstandard techniques we prove that each family sequencing game has a non-empty core by showing that a particular marginal vector belongs to the core. Finally, we specifically analyze the case in which the initial order is family ordered.

In a resource allocation problem, there is a common-pool resource, which has to be divided among agents. Each agent is characterized by a claim on this pool and an individual concave reward function on assigned resources, thus generalizing the model of Grundel et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 78(2):149-169, 2013) with linear reward functions. An assignment of resources is optimal if the total joint reward is maximized. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality of an assignment, based on bilateral transfers of resources only. Analyzing the associated allocation problem of the maximal total joint reward, we consider corresponding resource allocation games. It is shown that the core and the nucleolus of a resource allocation game are equal to the core and the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy game.

This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of maximizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents. Analyzing these situations a new class of transferable utility games is introduced, called multipurpose resource games. These games are based on the bankruptcy model, as introduced by O'Neill (1982). It is shown that every multipurpose resource game is compromise stable. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.