The developed word stands at the fore of a phenomenal demographic transition. Over the next 30 years the number of elderly in the U.S., the EU, and Japan will more than double. At the same time, the number of workers available to pay the elderly their government-guaranteed pension and health care benefits will rise by less than 10 percent. The fiscal implications of these two demographic trends are alarming. Paying promised benefits will, it appears, require a doubling or more of payroll tax rates. This paper asks if there is a silver lining in this dark cloud hanging over the developed world. Specifically, can the developed economies hope to be bailed out by either macroeconomic feedback effects of by increased migration? To address these questions, this paper develops and simulates a dynamic, intergeneration, and interregional demographic life-cycle model. The model has three regions-the U.S., the EU, and Japan-which exchange goods and capital. The model features immigration, age-specific fertility, life span extension, life span uncertainty, bequests arising from incomplete annuitization, and intracohort heterogeneity.

This paper and its companion study, Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2004), develop a three-region dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model to analyze general and skill-specific immigration policy during the demographic transition. The three regions are the U.S., Japan, and the EU. Immigration is often offered as a solution to the remarkable again underway in the developed world. Absent an immediate and dramatic change in immigration, dependency ratios will roughly double over the next three decades placing fiscal institutions, in particular, and economies, in general, under enormous stress. Can immigration alleviate these stresses? The answer is unclear bacause a number of offsetting factors are at play. First, increased immigration raises the size of the labor force, but also lowers real wages. Hence, the increase in the taxable wage base due to immigration will be less than might otherwise be expected. Second, immigrants arrive with some capital and accumulate more capital as they age. This raises labor productivity and both payroll and income tax bases. Third, immigrants, like natives, require public goods and become eligible for government welfare, health care, and pension benefits. Fiscally speaking, how much one "earns" from a new immigrant depends on the immigant's skill level, which, in turn, determines the immigrant's level of earnings. The reason is that taxes and transfer payments are, in general, collected and distributed on a progressive basis. Consequently, high-skilled immigrants deliver a larger bang for the buck when it comes to paying net taxes (taxes paid net of transfer payments received). Our model confirms this point. Nonetheless, its findings, even with respect to high-skilled immigration, which we investigate in detail in this paper, are not pretty. It shows that a significant expansion of immigration, whether across all skill groups or among particular skill groups, will do remarkably little to alter the major capital shortage, tax hikes, and reductions in real wages that can be expected along the demographic transition.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The model features three regions -the U.S., Japan, and the EU-15 -and incorporates age-and time-specific fertility and mortality rates, detailed fiscal institutions, and international capital mobility, subject to adjustment costs. Our simulations confirm the offsetting fiscal and economic consequences of both higher fertility and lower mortality rates. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayThe simulations indicate very minor effects on the developed world's rather bleak baseline transition path from either major increases in fertility rates or major reductions in mortality rates.JEL Code: D58, H55, J11.

This paper and its companion study, Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2004), develop a three-region dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model to analyze general and skill-specific immigration policy during the demographic transition. The three regions are the U.S., Japan, and the EU. Immigration is often offered as a solution to the remarkable again underway in the developed world. Absent an immediate and dramatic change in immigration, dependency ratios will roughly double over the next three decades placing fiscal institutions, in particular, and economies, in general, under enormous stress.Can immigration alleviate these stresses? The answer is unclear bacause a number of offsetting factors are at play. First, increased immigration raises the size of the labor force, but also lowers real wages. Hence, the increase in the taxable wage base due to immigration will be less than might otherwise be expected. Second, immigrants arrive with some capital and accumulate more capital as they age. This raises labor productivity and both payroll and income tax bases. Third, immigrants, like natives, require public goods and become eligible for government welfare, health care, and pension benefits.Fiscally speaking, how much one "earns" from a new immigrant depends on the immigant's skill level, which, in turn, determines the immigrant's level of earnings. The reason is that taxes and transfer payments are, in general, collected and distributed on a progressive basis. Consequently, high-skilled immigrants deliver a larger bang for the buck when it comes to paying net taxes (taxes paid net of transfer payments received).Our model confirms this point. Nonetheless, its findings, even with respect to high-skilled immigration, which we investigate in detail in this paper, are not pretty. It shows that a significant expansion of immigration, whether across all skill groups or among particular skill groups, will do remarkably little to alter the major capital shortage, tax hikes, and reductions in real wages that can be expected along the demographic transition.

We thank the National Center for Policy Analysis for Research Support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19757.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.