Partisanship is a primary predictor of attitudes toward public policy. However, we do not yet know whether party similarly plays a role in shaping public policy behavior, such as whether to apply for government benefits or take advantage of public services. While existing research has identified numerous factors that increase policy uptake, the role of politics has been almost entirely overlooked. In this paper, we examine the case of the Affordable Care Act to assess whether policy uptake is not only about information and incentives; but also about politics. Using longitudinal data, we find that Republicans have been less likely than Democrats to enroll in an insurance plan through state or federal exchanges, all else equal. Employing a large-scale field experiment, we then show that de-emphasizing the role of government (and highlighting the market's role) can close this partisan gap.

Federal subsidies for health insurance premiums sold through the Marketplaces are tied to the cost of the benchmark plan, the second-lowest-cost silver plan. According to economic theory, the presence of more competitors should lead to lower premiums, implying smaller federal outlays for premium subsidies. The long-term impact of the Affordable Care Act on government spending will depend on the cost of these premium subsidies over time, with insurer participation and the level of competition likely to influence those costs. We studied insurer participation and premiums during the first two years of the Marketplaces. We found that the addition of a single insurer in a county was associated with a 1.2 percent lower premium for the average silver plan and a 3.5 percent lower premium for the benchmark plan in the federally run Marketplaces. We found that the effect of insurer entry was muted after two or three additional entrants. These findings suggest that increased insurer participation in the federally run Marketplaces reduces federal payments for premium subsidies.

No abstract

Context: Political partisanship can influence whether individuals enroll in government programs. In particular, Republicans, ceteris paribus, are less likely to enroll in Affordable Care Act (ACA) individual marketplace insurance than Democrats. The logic of adverse selection suggests low uptake among Republicans would generally put upward pressure on marketplace premiums, especially in geographic areas with more Republican partisans. Methods: Using data from Healthcare.gov at the rating area level, this article examines the association between Republican vote share and growth in ACA marketplace premiums, being careful to account for potential confounding variables. Findings: Insurers have increased marketplace premiums at higher rates in areas with more Republican voters. In the preferred model specification, a 10-percentage-point difference in Republican vote share is associated with a 3.2-percentage-point increase in average premium growth for a standard plan. A variety of robustness and placebo checks suggest the relationship is driven by partisanship. Conclusions: Partisan polarization can threaten the successful implementation of policies that rely on high levels of citizen participation.

Context: State governments have been powerful sites of Republican resistance to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Democratic Party's signature 2010 law. By influencing how citizens experience the ACA, state-level implementation can affect the national-level political implications of the law. Methods: I examine three largely unstudied areas of marketplace implementation: navigator laws, transitional plan termination, and rating area configurations. For each policy area, I use linear probability models to investigate the determinants of state lawmakers bolstering or eroding marketplaces. Findings: In each case, Democrat-controlled states were more likely to bolster marketplaces than Republican-controlled states were, with decisions more polarized in those policy areas—navigator laws and transitional plan termination—and with greater potential for national-level feedback. For navigator laws, where Republican state lawmakers were most cross-pressured by national party interests and local interests, marketplace eroding policy was highly associated with strength of conservative networks. Conclusion: Crafters of federal legislation cannot expect state lawmakers to universally implement federal law to maximize the direct benefits to their constituents. Rather, we should expect state lawmakers to, in many instances, implement federal law in ways that benefit their parties.