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A distinction is made between two forms of morality based on approach-avoidance differences in self-regulation. Prescriptive morality is sensitive to positive outcomes, activation-based, and focused on what we should do. Proscriptive system is sensitive to negative outcomes, inhibition-based, and focused on what we should not do. Seven studies profile these two faces of morality, support their distinct motivational underpinnings, and provide evidence of moral asymmetry. Both are well-represented in our moral repertoire and equivalent in terms of moral weight, but proscriptive morality is condemnatory and strict, whereas prescriptive morality is commendatory and not strict.More specifically, in these studies proscriptive morality was perceived as concrete, mandatory, and duty-based, whereas prescriptive morality was more abstract, discretionary, and based in duty or desire; proscriptive immorality resulted in greater blame, whereas prescriptive morality resulted in greater moral credit. Implications for broader social regulation, including cross-cultural differences and political orientation, are discussed. Two Faces of Moral Regulation 3 Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Morality: Two Faces of Moral RegulationReflecting our fundamental social interdependence, morality involves standards of conduct developed to coordinate and facilitate group living

Theory of planned behavior (TPB) variables and anticipated affect were assessed in relation to drinking and avoiding alcohol and in relation to eating and avoiding fast food. It was shown that previously reported residual effects of anticipated affect in the prediction of intentions are obtained only when the TPB variables are assessed with respect to one behavior (action or inaction) and anticipated affect is measured in relation to the alternative behavior. When all variables were assessed with respect to the same behavior, anticipated affect made no independent contribution to the prediction of intentions, nor did anticipated affect retain a residual effect when the TPB constructs in relation to the alternative action were included in the prediction equation.

Recent critiques of moral psychology and the contemporary culture wars highlight the need for a better understanding of diverse moral perspectives. A model of moral motives is proposed. The fundamental approach-avoidance distinction in motivation is crossed with self-other focus to create four moral motives: Self-Restraint (avoidance-self), Social Order (avoidance-other), Self-Reliance (approach-self), and Social Justice (approach-other). Three studies explored these motives in the context of political orientation. Overall, political conservatism was associated with avoidance motives and liberalism with approach motives. Approach-avoidance motives were also associated with distinct patterns of results regarding authoritarianism, social dominance, and positions on contemporary social issues. Responses of campus political groups demonstrated the utility of the moral motives in providing a more nuanced view of politics that also takes into account the model's second dimension, for an emphasis on Self focus (personality responsibility) versus Other focus (social responsibility) further distinguished between conservative groups. Moral and political implications are discussed.

A self-regulatory framework for distinguishing between shame and guilt was tested in three studies. Recently, two forms of moral regulation based on approach versus avoidance motivation have been proposed in the literature. Proscriptive regulation is sensitive to negative outcomes, inhibition based, and focused on what we should not do. Prescriptive regulation is sensitive to positive outcomes, activation based, and focused on what we should do. In the current research, consistent support was found for shame's proscriptive and guilt's prescriptive moral underpinnings. Study 1 found a positive association between avoidance orientation and shame proneness and between approach orientation and guilt proneness. In Study 2, priming a proscriptive orientation increased shame and priming a prescriptive orientation increased guilt. In Study 3, transgressions most apt to represent proscriptive and prescriptive violations predicted subsequent judgments of shame and guilt, respectively. This self-regulatory perspective provides a broad interpretive framework for understanding and extending past research findings.