There is a widespread perception that power is shifting in global politics and that emerging powers are assuming a more prominent, active and important role. This article examines the role of emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa (BASIC) in climate change politics and the extent to which their rise makes the already difficult problem of climate change still more intractable—due to their rapid economic development, growing power‐political ambitions, rising greenhouse gas emissions and apparent unwillingness to accept global environmental ‘responsibility’. By reviewing the developments in global climate politics between the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and Rio+20, this article unsettles the image of a clear shift in power, stressing instead the complexity of the changes that have taken place at the level of international bargaining as well as at the domestic and transnational levels. Within this picture, it is important not to overestimate the shifts in power that have taken place, or to underplay the continued relevance of understanding climate change within the North–South frame. Emerging powers will certainly remain at the top table of climate change negotiations, but their capacity actively to shape the agenda has been limited and has, in some respects, declined. Even though emerging powers have initiated and offered greater action on climate change, both internationally and domestically, they have been unable to compel the industrialized world to take more serious action on this issue, or to stop them from unpicking several of the key elements and understandings of the original Rio deal. At the same time, developing world coalitions on climate change have also fragmented, raising questions about the continued potency of the ‘global South’ in future climate politics.

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India’s positions in global climate negotiations have evolved over three distinct periods. The first period of international regime creation in the 1980s and 1990s saw India play an important role in building coalitions with developing countries to draw clear commitments from developed countries on emission reduction, finance, and technology transfers. In the second period from 2005 to 2010, marked by transition and contestation, India showed flexibility and put forth voluntary commitments, while opposing moves to dilute the concept of differentiated responsibility. The third period, from 2011 to 2015, was marked by Indian compromise with changing negotiation contours that pushed for symmetrical treatment of developing and developed countries in matters of differentiation. This chapter also explores the reasons for continuity and change in India’s positions over the decades.

The world today faces an unprecedented climate crisis. This is not just an environmental challenge, but also a major threat to global order in the twenty-first century. One of its defining features is the sharp disconnect that exists between those responsible for causing the problem and those bearing its worst impacts, and the unwillingness of the former to take remedial action to the extent required. What is even more remarkable is the degree to which meaningful recognition and redressal of justice claims in the international climate debate have now been almost completely cast aside and relegated to the background, as was seen in the 2015 Paris Agreement. The article thus asks: can international order be sustained without meeting basic claims of climate justice? To answer this, it first goes back in time to recall how equity and justice considerations were incorporated in the original multilateral responses to climate change. It then reviews how these key elements of climate justice are reflected in the current climate regime. In examining the contrast between the past and the present, it also explores some of the other factors that have now complicated international climate justice claims. Finally, it assesses what this means from the perspective of global order and why the failure to substantively address key climate justice concerns poses significant risks to future global order and stability.