In the recent decades, privacy scholarship has made significant progress. Most of it was achieved in monodisciplinary works. However, privacy has a deeply interdisciplinary nature. Most importantly, societies as well as individuals experience privacy as being influenced by legal, technical, and social norms and structures. In this article, we hence attempt to connect insights of different academic disciplines into a joint model, an Interdisciplinary Privacy and Communication Model. The model differentiates four different elements: communication context, protection needs, threat and risk analysis, as well as protection enforcement. On the one hand, with this model, we aim to describe how privacy unfolds. On the other hand, the model also prescribes how privacy can be furnished and regulated. As such, the model contributes to a general understanding of privacy as a theoretical guide and offers a practical basis to address new challenges of the digital age.

Privacy scholars, advocates, and activists repeatedly emphasize the fact that current measures of privacy protection are insufficient to counter the systemic threats presented by datafication and platformization (van Dijck, de Waal, and Poell 2018: 24). These threats include discrimination against underprivileged groups, monopolization of power and knowledge, as well as manipulation. In this paper, we take that analysis one step further, suggesting that the consequences of inappropriate privacy protection online possibly even run counter to the normative principles that underpinned the standard clause for privacy protection in the first place. We discuss the ways in which attempts at protection run the risk of producing results that not only diverge from but, paradoxically, even distort the normative goals they intended to reach: informational self-determination, empowerment, and personal autonomy. Drawing on the framework of “normative paradoxes,” we argue that the ideals of a normatively increasingly one-sided, liberal individualism create complicities with the structural dynamics of platform capitalism, which in turn promote those material-discursive practices of digital usage that are ultimately extremely privacy-invasive.

Digital communication now pervades all spheres of life, creating new possibilities for commodification: personal data and communication are the new resources of surplus value. This in turn brings about a totally new category of threats to privacy. With recourse to the culture industry critique of early critical theory, this article seeks to challenge basic theoretical assumptions held within a liberal account of privacy. It draws the attention to the entanglement of technical and socio-economic transformations and aims at elaborating an alternative framing which takes into account that privacy is not in the first place a pre-political space for individual freedom but a constituted sphere in which social power relations are reproduced in a particularly deceitful way. With recourse to positions of critical theory, this article revisits the conceptual ambiguity of liberation and oppression and looks to draft prospects for a socio-theoretical justification and critique of privacy, updated for the digital age. Following the tradition of critical theory, the argument focuses on (new) forms of domination in and by privacy. It aims to prepare the ground for a critique of the social’s increasing commodification as well as an idea of privacy understood as reflexive participation in social practices.

This article discusses freedom of movement under the lens of shifting boundaries of membership and traces the tension between the political and the economic rationale of European integration. It first reflects on the normativity of free movement and links it to the foundations of modern democratic citizenship. Subsequently, it discusses the role of free movement in the construction of EU citizenship and argues that the genesis in market integration casts a long shadow which hinders EU citizenship's potential to fully display the logic of political and social equality. Under current conditions of huge wealth discrepancies between member states, the prevailing form of horizontal integration necessarily brings about a tension between mobility and solidarity, which in turn creates a barrier for further developing EU citizenship. It is concluded that strengthening an intra-European dimension of solidarity is needed in order to substantiate the right to move as an equal European citizenship right. 1 | INTRODUCTION Free movement for persons is at the core of EU citizenship. As first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) it guarantees the right 'to move and reside freely within the Territory of the member states'. 1 Originally emanating as part of the 'four freedoms' constituting the common market the introduction of a European citizenship status May Joana Mendes and Harm Schepel, the former Editors-in-Chief who accepted these manuscripts for publication, be thanked for their work and contribution to the European Law Journal.

Der öffentliche und akademische Diskurs um Privatheit wird seit seinen Anfängen durch technische Entwicklungen vorangetrieben. 1 Auf Diagnosen einer Gefährdung des Privaten wird dabei auf jeder Stufe mit neuen rechtlichen Schutzansprüchen reagiert. Diese Dynamik setzt sich bis in die Gegenwart fort: Der neueste technische Innovationsschub, der unsere Gesellschaften gegenwärtig durchzieht, spiegelt sich in dem vom BVerfG neu geschaffenen Grundrecht auf "Gewährleistung der Vertraulichkeit 1 So führt z.B. die Erfindung der Fotographie und damit verbunden die sich entfesselnde Dynamik der Berichterstattung einer Sensationspresse in den USA zu einer ersten systematischen Begründung eines (ungeschriebenen) Verfassungsrechts auf Privatheit ("right to privacy") durch Samuel Warren und Luis Brandeis (siehe DuD 10/2012, S. 755-766). Die Erfindung des Telefons macht den rechtlichen Schutz einer "Privatheit auf Distanz" nötig, sofern in die direkte Kommunikation zwischen Personen ist nun eine technische Infrastruktur eingeschaltet.