Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe investigate the effects of different regulatory policies directed towards high-frequency trading (HFT) through an agent-based model of a limit order book able to generate flash crashes as the result of the interactions between low-and high-frequency (HF) traders. We analyze the impact of the imposition of minimum resting times, of circuit breakers (both ex-post and ex-ante types), of cancellation fees and of transaction taxes on asset price volatility and on the occurrence and duration of flash crashes. In the model, lowfrequency agents adopt trading rules based on chronological time and can switch between fundamentalist and chartist strategies. In contrast, high-frequency traders activation is event-driven and depends on price fluctuations. In addition, high-frequency traders employ low-latency directional strategies that exploit market information and they can cancel their orders depending on expected profits. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that reducing HF order cancellation, via minimum resting times or cancellation fees, or discouraging HFT via financial transaction taxes, reduces market volatility and the frequency of flash crashes. However, these policies also imply a longer duration of flash crashes. Furthermore, the introduction of an ex-ante circuit breaker markedly reduces price volatility and removes flash crashes. In contrast, ex-post circuit breakers do not affect market volatility and they increase the duration of flash crashes. Our results show that HFT-targeted policies face a trade-off between market stability and resilience. Policies that reduce volatility and the incidence of flash crashes also imply a reduced ability of the market to quickly recover from a crash. The dual role of HFT, as both a cause of the flash crash and a fundamental actor in the post-crash recovery underlies the above trade-off.

Abstract. We build an agent-based model to study how the interplay between low-and highfrequency trading affects asset price dynamics. Our main goal is to investigate whether highfrequency trading exacerbates market volatility and generates flash crashes. In the model, lowfrequency agents adopt trading rules based on chronological time and can switch between fundamentalist and chartist strategies. On the contrary, high-frequency traders activation is event-driven and depends on price fluctuations. High-frequency traders use directional strategies to exploit market information produced by low-frequency traders. Monte-Carlo simulations reveal that the model replicates the main stylized facts of financial markets. Furthermore, we find that the presence of high-frequency trading increases market volatility and plays a fundamental role in the generation of flash crashes. The emergence of flash crashes is explained by two salient characteristics of highfrequency traders, i.e., their ability to i) generate high bid-ask spreads and ii) synchronize on the sell side of the limit order book. Finally, we find that higher rates of order cancellation by high-frequency traders increase the incidence of flash crashes but reduce their duration.

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