We use a structural VAR model with short-term restrictions to investigate the relative importance of interest rate, exchange rate and credit channels in the monetary policy transmission (MPT) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland over 1993:1-2004:3. Main results are as follows. First, in the three countries, following a positive shock on the interest rate, prices increase instead of decreasing, due to the immediate depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The results thus exhibit an "exchange rate" puzzle conducing to the appearance of a "price-puzzle". Second, none channel is very powerful for the MPT in the three countries. Nevertheless, the exchange rate and the interest rate channels play a growing role over the recent period in Poland, compared with the same channels in the Czech Republic and Hungary. As nominal exchange rate fluctuations allow for greater real shocks dampening in Poland, the cost of entering EMU may be more costly for this country than for the Czech Republic or Hungary. * We are grateful to Benoît Usciati for his able research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

Département des études de l'OFCE Juillet 2005 Revue de l'OFCE 9 94 4 * Cet article est une version remaniée de « Measuring the effect of international relocations on the French economy », Annexe 8, Rapport EUROFRAME-EFN, réalisé pour la Commission européenne, printemps 2005, disponible sur http://www.euroframe.org ** Les auteurs remercient Jérôme Creel, Georges Gelauff, Catherine Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak pour leurs conseils et leurs commentaires avisés.

L'etude porte sur les canaux de transmission de la politique monetaire (ctpm) en Hongrie, en Pologne et en Republique tcheque entre 1995 et 2004. Elle est basee sur une analyse vectorielle autoregressive incluant le credit parmi les varia bles endogenes. Les pays partagent un certain nombre de points communs en ter mes de ctpm : un impact rapide, mais faible, sur la production industrielle; la pre sence d'une ? enigme ? du taux de change plutot que des prix apres une hausse du taux d'interet; et un canal du credit encore balbutiant. Comparativement a la Republique tcheque et a la Hongrie, c'est en Pologne que les canaux du taux de change et du taux d'inter?t jouent le rdle le plus important sur la periode r¢e : le cout d'entree dans la zone euro pourrait done etre plus 6leve pour la Pologne. MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS IN THE EU: THE CASES OF THREE NEWCOMERS A structural var model is used to investigate the relative importance of interest rate, exchange rate and credit channels in the monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland between 1995 and 2004. Main results are as follows. First, responses of industrial production to the monetary shocks are fast but are not long-lived. Second, there is no ? price-puzzle ? per se, but instead an ? exchange rate puzzle ?. Third, the credit channel is not yet very powerful. Over the recent period, the exchange rate and interest rate channels have played a more prominent role in Poland than in the Czech Republic and Hungary: entering emu may thus be more costly for Poland.

Special issue * We are very grateful to Guillaume Chevillon, Matthieu Lemoine and Henri Sterdyniak for their helpful suggestions and advice. A preliminary version of this paper was presented during a conference on 'Enlargement Economics', organised by ROSES, Maison des Sciences Economiques, in Paris, 5-6 June 2003. We wish to thank our discussant, Hubert Kempf, for his stimulating remarks. The usual disclaimer applies.

Special issueThe debate about unilateral euroisation (i.e. the unilateral adoption of the euro as legal tender) that emerged in CEECs at the end of the 1990s has finally ebbed in 2000 following the very negative reaction of the EU officials. We argue, however, that we may potentially see a renewal of the debate in the future if the institutional path set by EU to introduce the euro is not modified. Indeed, both the political and the economic context are now radically different from the ones existing in 2000. In this paper, two main lines of argument are developed. First, the credibility of (implicit) sanctions in the event of unilateral euroisation is currently very low, even nil, because acceding countries are now de facto economically and politically integrated into the EU. Second, the recent economic slowdown and a recovery that has not been as strong and fast as expected, have resulted in a halt to the nominal convergence process that may delay their entry in EMU. Given the risk of unilateral euroisation, we argue that either consensual euroisation or, at least, a relaxation of nominal convergence criteria would be a better option from the viewpoint of both current and future members of EU.