In this paper we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium fiscal model for the Colombian economy. The model has three main components: the existence of non-Ricardian households, price and wage rigidities, and a fiscal authority that finances government spending partly with public debt. The model is calibrated to capture the empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of government spending and it is used to study the effect of an oil price shock under different fiscal policy rules. Our results show that fiscal multipliers in Colombia are 1 We thank Hernando Vargas, Eduardo Sarmiento Gómez, Jesus A. Bejarano and Sergio Ocampo for comments on earlier drafts. We also thank Guilherme de Almeida Bandeira for early research assistance in the model. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of the Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.

Modelo fiscal neokeynesiano-DSGE Política fiscal Política monetaria Canales y mecanismos de transmisión Regla fiscal estructural r e s u m e n El gobierno es un agente que influye sobre la actividad económica a lo largo del ciclo económico mediante sus políticas tributaria y de gasto. El objetivo de este documento es construir un modelo fiscal de equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico neokeynesiano para Colombia (FISCO), en donde el gobierno juega un papel preponderante en la economía. Las cinco principales conclusiones del documento muestran que: la inflación compete tanto a la política monetaria como a la política fiscal; los choques a la política fiscal son contrarrestados en cierto grado por la política monetaria, pero choques a esta última son refrendados por la política fiscal; el recorte al gasto público de inversión impacta en mayor medida a la economía que el ajuste al de funcionamiento, y la regla fiscal estabiliza las finanzas públicas, pero ante ciertos choques.

The adoption of a managed regime assumes that interventions are relatively successful. However, while some authors consider that foreign exchange interventions are ineffective, arguing that domestic and foreign assets are close substitutes, others advocate their use and maintain that their effects can even last for months. There is also a lack of consensus on the related question of how to intervene. Are dirty interventions more powerful than pre-announced ones? This paper compares the effects of day-to-day interventions with discretionary interventions by combining a Tobit-GARCH reaction function with an asymmetric power PGARCH(1,

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