Sentencing decisions in capital cases are to be guided by a consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This article presents a review of the literature on what mock jurors and actual capital jurors find aggravating and mitigating. Although there is relatively little empirical research available that addresses those issues directly, what does exist is relatively consistent, especially as it pertains to aggravation. Jurors are most persuaded for death by evidence and even mere perceptions of a defendant's future dangerousness particularly when couched in terms of psychopathy. Likewise, defendants who are perceived as suffering from or experiencing traumatic life events that are out of their control are more likely to receive a sentence of life. The article concludes with a review of the research on how jurors respond to evidence presented in different modes that could help explain receptivity to aggravation and mitigation.

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Recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions have given rise to the question of whether persons suffering from a severe mental illness should be categorically exempt from the death penalty. This article presents a brief overview of relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases and the empirical evidence relevant to this question. We then present our findings on how actual capital jurors respond to and discuss engaging with evidence of mental illness, as drawn from in-depth interviews collected as part of the Capital Jury Project. Existing research reveals that in the controlled situation of an experiment, evidence of mental illness is associated with votes for life rather than death. Similarly, actual capital jurors in our study reported anticipating that evidence of mental illness would make them less likely to vote for death. However, those jurors who dealt with mental illness in their case appeared to be less sensitive: they describe such evidence as having been overshadowed by the brutality of the crime; as indicative of the defendant's future dangerousness; as being confusing, especially as presented by experts; and as a manipulative attempt on the part of the defendant to trick the jurors. The findings suggest that capital jurors cannot reliably comprehend and account for evidence of mental illness and thus offer a compelling reason for the Court to exempt those suffering from a mental illness from the death penalty.

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