This paper examines the ethical failure of theodicies by integrating the perspectives of philosophical argumentation and literary reading and analysis. The paper consists of two main parts. In the first part, we propose an ethical critique of metaphysical realism by analyzing its inability to recognize the perspectival plurality and diversity of suffering. As theodicies seek to explain how an omnipotent, omniscient, and absolutely benevolent God could allow the world to contain evil and suffering, it can be argued that metaphysical realism-i.e., the thesis that the world possesses its own fundamental structure independently of human perspectives of conceptualization and inquiryis a problematic starting point of theodicism. We examine the failure of recognition of others' suffering inherent in theodicies as a failure based on the search for an overall reductive and objectifying picture (a "God's-Eye View") that is constitutive of metaphysical realism. The second part of the paper shows why we should include insights from imaginative literature in our attempts to understand the recognition failures of theodicies. Emphasizing the literary, philosophical, and theological relevance of various modern rewritings of the Book of Job, which has been a crucially important sub-text for many later literary works in which the protagonists render a particular kind of human experience-unmerited suffering-we turn more closely to some literary examples, such as Joseph Roth's novels Hiob and Die Rebellion. The tensions that are created around the moral controversy of the experiences of injustice and suffering and the human and religious reasoning and justification of violence are examined. The ambiguous ending of Hiob that adds an apparently hopeful and almost fairytale-like redemption to the story plays a crucial role in the interpretation provided in the paper. By analyzing some literary examples and their relation to the literary Job tradition, the recognition-failures of theodicist attempts to provide meaning into suffering-attempts based on metaphysical realism, as argued in the first part of the paper-are highlighted. Finally, we also critically consider the charge that theodicism could only be theoretically formulated and argue that a sharp distinction between theory and practice in this area is itself an act of non-recognition, or a failure to recognize suffering.

Abstract. In his essay "On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy," Immanuel Kant uses the literary figures of Job and his "friends" in his argument against theodicies. According to Kant, Job's sincerity (rather than his patience in suffering) is his key virtue, in contrast to his "friends." Theodicies turn out to be insincere and therefore morally flawed. This article examines the problem of evil from a perspective integrating literary reading and philosophy, arguing that the Kantian ethical criticism of theodicism based on the Book of Job is highly relevant to contemporary discussions of evil and theodicy. IThis essay is based on a double perspective provided by literary reading and philosophy for approaching the problem of evil through a critical analysis of certain (philosophical and/or theological) texts and characters constructed and represented in them, particularly Kant's theodicy essay and its most important pre-text, the Book of Job. This methodology yields a novel approach to the familiar issue of theodicy vs.anti-theodicy. Our methodology differs from the more standard ways of examining philosophical ideas expressed in literature (for example, in works by such "philosophical" writers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Samuel Beckett, or Siri Hustvedt). In the case discussed here, the use of literary figures and characters in a philosophical argument, rather than philosophical ideas and arguments in fictional literature, is central. Our discussion of the problem of evil and (anti-)theodicy seeks to show that certain ways of writing-especially of authoring a theodicy-could themselves be argued to exemplify moral vices and thereby to contribute to evil, instead of excusing or justifying it. That is, even intellectually

Thinking about the Other. Historical and Cultural Perspectives on Encountering Otherness Human lives are crucially shaped by encounters of otherness – or, rather, various othernesses. This book explores the ethical challenge of developing an appropriate and respectful relation to other human beings by analyzing a number of historical and cultural cases of relating to the other. The topics range from barbarism, racist stereotypes, female rhetoric, and vampires to philosophical analyses of Finnish writers like Eino Leino and Väinö Linna, and from lyrical depictions of pain to an “antitheodicist” reflection on Primo Levi’s Holocaust writing. A chapter on what it means to take a critical distance to other human beings in the context of the covid-19 pandemic concludes the volume. The authors approach these diverse issues (which are all aspects of the same basic problem of understanding and acknowledging otherness) from the perspective of an interdisciplinary humanistic reflection integrating literary analysis and philosophical argumentation.

This paper focuses on scholarly vices in early modern discussions and specifically in the writings of one seventeenth-century polemicist, the philosopher Hieronymus Hirnhaim (1637-79), an abbot of the monastery of Strahov in Prague.1 Hirnhaim was one of the important, but now forgotten, religious critics of his day who endeavoured to invalidate the power of human reason in favour of religious faith. Hirnhaim criticised learning and scholarly sins from the Christian and sceptical perspectives. He declared that all human knowledge was uncertain and harmful, since it gave rise to many vices and did not contribute to salvation. He composed a major polemical work on a humanity swollen with pride, De typho generis humani (1676), which has been called one of the most provocative publications of the seventeenth century and one of the most violent attacks on secular science.2 Hirnhaim's work is noteworthy, because it is exceptionally rich in images and polemical commonplaces which criticise the vices of learning. Furthermore, it must be read as a text that functions as part of the wider contemporary discussion on scholarly vices. A sceptic who expressed contempt for human knowledge and who declared that man should seek knowledge only from God and revelation, Hirnhaim questioned the self-sufficiency of the human mind and claimed that learning was evil unless it was supported by virtue. For him, revelation from God and an internal spiritual light were the only foundations of human knowledge.

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