The role of process safety in the undergraduate and graduate curriculum is a critical component of preparing chemical engineers for their future careers. In 2011, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) amended the requirements for Chemical, Biochemical, Biomolecular, and similarly named Engineering Programs. The change added a clause, indicating that the curriculum of said programs should not only include the engineering application of chemistry, physics, and/or biology to the design, analysis and control of processes, but also the hazards associated with those processes. Departments were then compelled to adjust their curricula to meet the new requirement which would go into effect during the 2012-2013 Accreditation evaluations. Herein, we present findings related to the major milestones and challenges associated with updating the chemical engineering curriculum to include process safety components at both the undergraduate and graduate level. First, a survey of publicly available information regarding curriculum requirements, course syllabi, and program developments at US universities will be discussed. Next, insights from evaluating the challenges associated with adding new content to an already overloaded curriculum will be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for continued improvement in the process safety education provided to undergraduate and graduate students will be presented.

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This paper compares hazard and risk factors related to transporting hydrogen in natural gas pipelines. Properties of hydrogen-compressed natural gas (HCNG) blends and typical materials for the construction of transmission and distribution systems are evaluated to address the key properties that might impact hazard and risk factors. ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) standards B31.8 and ASME B31.12 are reviewed for key differences applicable to HCNG blends. A methodology to identify compliance gaps and mitigate deficiencies if HCNG blends are transported in natural gas transportation systems is proposed.

Deficiencies in conduct of operations and operational discipline can lead to a decline in the quality of an organization's process safety culture and an increase in the likelihood of process safety incidents. A process safety assessment is one tool especially suited for identifying and correcting organizational safety culture deficiencies. Both AIChE/CCPS and API offer recent guidance documents on how to conduct effective assessments of process safety management systems.This article first introduces some basic concepts from game theory and applies them to the methodology of process safety assessments. A conceptual framework for the implementation of the process safety assessment process with balanced positive and corrective actions will be described. Assessment guidelines typically focus on the negative outcomes-correcting deficiencies. This article argues that the assessment process must also use the positive outcomes-the compliance successes-to provide positive reinforcement to the process safety culture. Implementing this strategy is consistent with pragmatic management practices and is supported by empirical studies in behavioral science. Finally, this article discusses how these ideas fit within the framework of AIChE/CCPS and API guidance documents.

Process hazard analysis is recognized by many safety professionals and regulatory groups as the key provision of a process safety management system. This analysis evaluates what can go wrong, and what safeguards are needed to prevent incidents. One challenge in process hazard analysis is the reliance on humans to determine reasonable, expected, or anticipated failure modes. The implementation of safeguards may also foster a lost sense of vulnerability to potential process upsets. These factors in combination can lead to a disregard for failure modes considered "unlikely" or even "impossible." Unfortunately, this problem is often revealed when the "impossible" leads to an incident or accident. In this article, a case study is used to motivate a discussion of incidents involving hazards that were disregarded in process hazard analysis due to their low probability, or supposed impossibility. Tools, techniques, and guidance will be discussed to improve process hazard analysis when evaluating low probability failure modes.