No monarchy fell to revolution in the Arab Spring. What accounts for this monarchical exceptionalism? Analysts have argued that royal autocracies are inherently more resilient than authoritarian republics due to their cultural foundations and institutional structure. By contrast, this paper leverages comparative analysis to offer a different explanation emphasizing deliberate regime strategies made in circumstances of geographic fortuity. The mobilization of cross-cutting coalitions, hydrocarbon wealth, and foreign patronage account for the resilience of monarchical dictatorships in the Middle East. Without these factors, kingships are just as vulnerable to overthrow as any other autocracy—something that history indicates, given the long list of deposed monarchies in the region over the past half-century.

During 2011/12, East Bank tribal youths in Jordan mobilized a new wave of political opposition through the Hirak movement. Reflecting generational change in their communities, as well as the historical erosion of tribal-state relations, these protest groups demanded sweeping democratic reforms from the monarchy. They also utilized language and methods more radical than the established legal opposition. This changing dynamic of tribal politics holds enormous implications for politics and stability within the Hashemite kingdom.

Most methods in comparative politics prescribe a deductive template of research practices that begins with proposing hypotheses, proceeds into analyzing data, and finally concludes with confirmatory tests. In reality, many scholars move back and forth between theory and data in creating causal explanations, beginning not with hypotheses but hunches and constantly revising their propositions in response to unexpected discoveries. Used transparently, such inductive iteration has contributed to causal knowledge in comparative-historical analysis, analytic narratives, and statistical approaches. Encouraging such practices across methodologies not only adds to the toolbox of comparative analysis but also casts light on how much existing work often lacks transparency. Because successful hypothesis testing facilitates publication, yet as registration schemes and mandatory replication do not exist, abusive practices such as data mining and selective reporting find easy cover behind the language of deductive proceduralism. Productive digressions from the deductive paradigm, such as inductive iteration, should not have the stigma associated with such impropriety.

While the canonical literature on oil wealth suggests that hydrocarbon windfalls encourage repressive despotism, Kuwait provides a case of an oil-rich autocracy governing instead through popular rentierism-that is, through a broad coalition of social forces, one that furnishes enduring loyalty from below while constraining abuses of state power from above. This paper provides a theoretically guided explanation for this exceptional outcome. I argue that the Kuwaiti regime's coalitional bargains originated in the pre-oil era, when domestic opposition and geopolitical constrictions compelled it to forge new social alliances at the dawn of modern statehood. This inclusionary strategy mediated the subsequent effect of oil rents, which the regime used to institutionalize its mass base with costly material and symbolic side payments. Such popular incorporation bound large constituent classes to the regime's survival, precluding the need for widespread repression. After 50 years, these coalitional bargains have also proven remarkably resilient, as social actors have continued to endorse the autocratic leadership despite economic crisis and wartime defeat.

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