The New Landscape of Jordanian Politics: Social Opposition, Fiscal Crisis, and the Arab Spring

Yom, Sean

doi:10.1080/13530194.2014.932271

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…As did the 1989 riots, the street demonstration in the Jordanian Arab Spring began in rural areas. Yom (2015) and Ryan (2018) discussed circumstantially the new activism, called Ḥirāk (“movement”), which began in the south of the country, and while it represented local youths’ resentment against the growing urban–rural income gap and political corruption in the central government, it also incorporated varied participants, less ideologized objectives, and the loose networking supported by new information technology, producing a distinctly novel style of protest (Ryan, 2018, pp. 31, 67).…”

Section: Phase One: Passive Regime Security Approach Against the Muslim Brotherhoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regime Security in Jordan Revisited: New Challenges to the Monarchy’s Resilience After the Arab Spring

Kikkawa

2021

Contemporary Review of the Middle East

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Jordan is one of the few authoritarian Arab regimes that survived region-wide mass protests during the Arab Spring, although the monarchy lacked enough force or resources to neutralize the dissident. This study analyzes the source of the resiliency of the Hashemite monarchy during 2011–2020 concerning regime security. The retreat of the Jordanian democratization movements in the early phase of the Arab Spring was the consequence of the opposition’s failure to achieve coordination and alignment, particularly the internal struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding how to respond and its successful co-optation by the government. The scope of regime security in Jordan experienced a dramatic shift from appeasement to coercion around 2014 because of the eroding social order in neighboring states, represented by the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq. Actions for securitization against Islamists, namely increased policing and tighter border control, were arranged through coercion and securing mass support in tandem. Jordan’s experience illustrates how this typically “weak state” secured its survival in this unprecedented, rapidly changing security situation.

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Section: Phase One: Passive Regime Security Approach Against the Muslim Brotherhoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regime Security in Jordan Revisited: New Challenges to the Monarchy’s Resilience After the Arab Spring

Kikkawa

2021

Contemporary Review of the Middle East

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“…Did Jordan's decision to regulate the domestic labor market by targeting illegal Egyptian migrants constitute a strategy of coercion against Egypt? Or, could it merely have been driven by other factors, such as the deterioration of the post-Arab Spring Jordanian economy (for contrast Yom 2015)? Qatamin publicly stated that the regulation campaign was driven by a "security," not "political" rationale (Middle East News Agency, December 9).…”

Section: Jordanian-egyptian Relations and The Provision Of Natural Gasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean

Tsourapas¹

2019

Preprint

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How do states attempt to use their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states, and under what conditions do they succeed? I argue that economically driven cross-border mobility generates reciprocal political economy effects on sending and host states. That is, it produces migration interdependence. Host states may leverage their position against a sending state by either deploying strategies of restriction—curbing remittances, strengthening immigration controls, or both—or displacement—forcefully expelling citizens of the sending state. These strategies’ success depends on whether the sending state is vulnerable to the political economy costs incurred by host states’ strategy, namely if it is unable to absorb them domestically and cannot procure the support of alternative host states. I also contend that displacement strategies involve higher costs than restriction efforts and are therefore more likely to succeed. I demonstrate my claims through a least-likely, two-case study design of Libyan and Jordanian coercive migration diplomacy against Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. I examine how two weaker Arab states leveraged their position against Egypt, a stronger state but one vulnerable to migration interdependence, through the restriction and displacement of Egyptian migrants.

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“…In Jordan, after all, it is the King who still appoints the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and it is the Royal Hashemite Court (the Diwan ), in conjunction with the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), that continues to hold ultimate power in the state. Despite nearly thirty years of political liberalization, moreover, at the time of writing, the elected Lower House—where IAF Members of Parliament serve—still lacks “basic legislative capabilities, such as the ability to propose bills and prepare the national budget” (Yom, 2015: 287). When it comes to economic policymaking and major projects like the writing of five-year economic plans, keeping with form, the regime generally proceeds by sidelining elected officials and by relying on the aforementioned Diwan as well as on the Economic Policy Council and the regime’s partners at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.…”

Section: Surveying the Economics Of The Iaf/jordanian Muslim Brotherhoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, however, an honest evaluation of the IAF’s dissenting politics in 2018 would be forced to address the underlying superficiality of the party’s efforts. After all, while challenging Mulki is well and good, the position of the Jordanian Prime Minister is little more than a proxy post through which the real institutions of power and policymaking—the King, his Diwan (the Royal Court), International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and the regime’s foreign allies—implement their designs (Abu Rish, 2012; Yom, 2015). This being the case, the IAF’s unwillingness to contest either the monarchy or the deeper structure of Jordan’s political economy renders their dissidence somewhat hollow.…”

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confidence: 99%

Run the country like a business? The economics of Jordan’s Islamic action front

Powers

2019

Critical Research on Religion

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The moral economics of the Islamic Action Front, the partisan wing of the original Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, is both defined and compromised by internal inconsistency. Similar to others that might be classified as a socially conservative, religiously-oriented political party, the Islamic Action Front pledges a paternalist commitment to the poor only to undermine the already limited prospects of such paternalism through the adoption of charity-based approaches to social welfare and through their more general advocacy for economic liberalization, free markets, capital mobility, and private initiative. How can one best explain both the contradictions constituting the Islamic Action Front's economics and the political implications contained within such an economic agenda? This article will review the intersection of local class structure, party ideology, and history so to furnish an answer.

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The New Landscape of Jordanian Politics: Social Opposition, Fiscal Crisis, and the Arab Spring

Cited by 16 publications

References 0 publications

Regime Security in Jordan Revisited: New Challenges to the Monarchy’s Resilience After the Arab Spring

Regime Security in Jordan Revisited: New Challenges to the Monarchy’s Resilience After the Arab Spring

Labor Migrants as Political Leverage: Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean

Run the country like a business? The economics of Jordan’s Islamic action front

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