The new coronavirus disease, or COVID-19, was first identified in late 2019 and declared as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2020. Turkey and Iran have been heavily affected by the outbreak, with over 460,000 and 890,000 cases reported respectively, so far. Even though these two countries have similar political and ideological approaches and are roughly the same size in terms of population density, as well as despite a high number of reported COVID-19 cases, a fast infection spread rate, and mismanagement of the crisis in both countries, Turkey's death toll remained lower when compared to the death toll in Iran. Deploying a comparative case study methodology drawing on an analysis of secondary sources, this study investigates Turkey and Iran's official responses to COVID-19 to further understand authoritarian reactions to large-scale crises and how distinctions between the actions taken by authoritarian regimes might impact crisis management in such contexts.

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Current transnational policing mechanisms such as Interpol appear to reproduce authoritarianism-like actions in democratic contexts by helping to undermine the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by non-democratic regimes. Through an in depth examination of the cases of Turkish and Russian police, this article seeks to explain the possible motives of the law enforcement institutions of democratic states in executing the questionable Interpol Red Notice requests by authoritarian regimes based on the existing theoretical debates in the literature on international policing. It explores three factors that foster policing cooperation between democratic and authoritarian states: 1) an aspired depoliticization of international policing that facilitates cooperation among states with different national and ideological outlooks; 2) an occupational culture that encourages professional support and solidarity among policing agents that transcends national rivalries; and 3) state cooperation against threats posed by the planning and conduct of international crime.

Previous research suggests that linkage to the West can have a strong democratizing influence on transitioning states. Yet, Western linkage and leverage lost much of their democratizing force by the early twenty‐first century. Turkey's political trajectory over the last decade furnishes a representative case study of the waning power of the West as an anchor for democratization in high‐linkage countries. Despite Turkey's robust ties to the West, competitive authoritarianism has been further entrenched and signs of a drift toward full‐fledged authoritarianism emerged since the failed coup of July 2016. We argue that in a context where the European Union and the United States’ willingness to support democracy declined considerably the AKP’s distancing from the West in foreign policy and balancing the Western powers with its new economic and political relations with autocratic regimes have served to stifle the democratizing pressure of Western linkage by lowering the cost of autocratic behavior for the AKP government and facilitating Turkey's illiberal turn.

U.S.-led coalition forces liberated all of the territory ISIS held in Syria and Iraq in the first quarter of 2019. Although the defeat was a significant achievement, ISIS continues its activities outside the Syria and Iraq region. Turkey matters to ISIS because the group carries out attacks and uses the country to move fighters and supplies. However, Turkey relies heavily on police crackdowns to deter terrorism. Drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Event and Location Database, the Turkish Ministry of Interior, and an online news source, the current study first analyzed trends in ISIS attacks around the world. Then, it explored the extent to which police arrests prevent ISIS from further deadly attacks in Turkey. Results from the study suggest that ISIS activities are likely to decrease in Syria and Iraq after the U.S.-led military operations but increase in other countries. Also, mass arrests were ineffective in preventing subsequent deadly attacks in Turkey. Policy implications are discussed.