The purpose of the paper is to investigate, first, the association between multiple directorship assignments (busyness) undertaken by corporate directors and firm performance, second, whether endogenously determined limits of multiple directorships, highlighting the ownership structure and other institutional settings, explain the above association better than those by exogenously mandated by regulators and third, the association between the nature of busyness and firm performance. The study develops measures of busyness in the light of the agency and resource dependence theories. The spline regression technique is applied in order to reflect institutional settings of a large sample and sub-samples of firms classified as local private, foreign and government firms in India. For local private firms, the association between the number of directorships and firm performance becomes negative before reaching the maximum number of directorships set by legislation, whereas, for foreign and government firms, the same continues to remain positive throughout. Endogenously determined cut-off points of busyness reflect institutional settings of firms, which may remain masked otherwise. The findings of the current paper can be useful to study the same phenomenon in other emerging markets having corporate governance, and ownership structures similar to that of India. The effect of busyness can be different on different firms; however, exogenously fixed regulatory limits do not reflect their institutional settings. The current paper is an attempt to fill in this research gap.

Abstract:The audit committees, as a part of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, play an important role to enhance the financial reporting quality. The busyness of audit committee members of a firm in boards and committees of other firms can affect its independent functioning, ceteris paribus. The current study examines, first, the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and quality of financial reporting in India, second, whether endogenously determined busyness limits of busyness of the audit committee members provide better insights than those exogenously mandated by regulators. The study finds that endogenously determined busyness limits of sub-samples and the full sample explain the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and financial reporting quality in a better way than those stipulated by regulators. Further, a lower (higher) level of busyness of audit committee members enhances (deteriorates) financial reporting quality of firms.

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Abstract:The audit committees, as a part of the internal corporate governance mechanisms, play an important role to enhance the financial reporting quality. The busyness of audit committee members of a firm in boards and committees of other firms can affect its independent functioning, ceteris paribus. The current study examines, first, the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and quality of financial reporting in India, second, whether endogenously determined busyness limits of busyness of the audit committee members provide better insights than those exogenously mandated by regulators. The study finds that endogenously determined busyness limits of sub-samples and the full sample explain the association between multiple directorships of audit committee members and financial reporting quality in a better way than those stipulated by regulators. Further, a lower (higher) level of busyness of audit committee members enhances (deteriorates) financial reporting quality of firms.