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The article contributes to a better understanding of 'Traditional Islam' (TI), a state-led project in Azerbaijan to establish an alternative narrative promoting a specific local understanding of Islam that builds on its non-political, non-sectarian and national features to prevent 'non-traditional' religious variants from gaining popular traction. The phenomenon has not appeared in a vacuum. First, its features and functions stem from Soviet-era anti-religious and nationalities policies. Second, many aspects of TI resemble counter-radicalisation initiatives worldwide. Finally, while introduced as a means of blocking radicalisation in order to protect Azerbaijan's national identity as a secular state, Traditional Islam in fact works to extend state control over the religious domain and thus to prevent the development of any religiously grounded dissent against the authoritarian regime.'IF MY PEOPLE MUST BE MUSLIM, LET THEM BE THIS KIND OF Muslim. If my brother wants to be Muslim, I'd want him to follow Traditional Islam.' 1 This comment was made by Gunduz Ismayilov, a representative of the Azerbaijani State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (Dini Qurumlarla İş Üzrə Dövlət Komitəsi-SCWRA), the lead institution behind an ambitious state project to counteract the spread of 'foreign' Islam among the citizens of Azerbaijan through the development and promotion of a national religious creed and practice-Traditional Islam (Ənənəvi İslam-TI). Most citizens of post-Soviet Azerbaijan identify as Muslim. What this quote underscores it that, for religious and secular elites, Islam is perceived as a key part of the national ideology and is seen as integral to the new Azerbaijani identity (Mahmudlu 2017). The state is strictly secular; the fear of radicalisation as a result of foreign religious influences promoting a worldview where Islam plays a more prominent, and ultimately political, role has been an important factor in domestic policy since the beginning of the 2000s. How this threat has been used by the ruling elite to legitimise strengthened control over religious

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This article seeks to study the consequences of the Nagorno–Karabakh war for Azerbaijan: thus analyzes findings on occupied territories, casualties, and damages of the war from economic, political, and social perspectives. The utmost brutality and atrocity of the overall conflict is memorized with Khojaly Massacre committed against Azerbaijani civilians on 26 February 1992. Hence, the article unveils evidences through the scrutiny of secondary data from academic sources, publications, and news materials published by international media. The particular focus of the study is concentrated on to what extend special plan was prepared deliberately for ethnic cleansing in Khojaly during the Nagorno–Karabakh war.