In this research, we evaluated user participation and involvement in the context of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. Since ERP systems are enterprisewide in scope, these systems have a high level of complexity, and require a different implementation methodology. While most studies analyze implementation at an organization or industry level, there is a dearth in research in ERP system adoption at the individual or user level. In our study, we examine ERP system acceptance at the individual level. In this research, we expected to find differences in the nature of user participation and involvement in ERP compared to other information systems. Using Barki and Hartwick's extension of the theory of reasoned action, a revised model was developed and tested empirically. While Barki and Hartwick's model explains user behavior vis-à-vis user participation and involvement, a more parsimonious model demonstrates that usage dynamics in ERP implementation are different. We complemented our statistical analysis by three case studies. Based on our results we believe that, given the nature of ERP and its implementation, traditionally formalized links between influencers of users' attitude and involvement may need to be revised. We have discussed why we need to seek alternate forms of influencers. In doing so, we suggest that investments be made in preparatory work practices and employee development prior to ERP decisions. Such investments are complementary to information technology and are widespread throughout the firm. We believe that such investments will play a significant role in influencing the attitude of users toward any system and also their involvement.

Traditional economic theory predicts that unfunded social security can be justified on the basis of its ability to efficiently finance retirement, and also for its ability to provide insurance against mortality risk and uninsurable shocks to labor income. In this paper, I demonstrate that the quantitative importance of the traditional roles of social security depends on how household labor supply responds to social security. I build a calibrated general-equilibrium model where social security has a large welfare-improving role, and I show that the distortionary effect on households' labor hours erases virtually all the welfare gains from social security. I also find that this result is robust within the range of labor supply elasticities usually encountered in the macroeconomic literature.

I examine if the positive correlation between wealth and survivorship has any implications for the progressivity of Social Security's current benefit-earnings rule. Using a general-equilibrium macroeconomic model calibrated to the U.S. economy, I show that the optimal benefit-earnings link for Social Security is largely insensitive to wealth-dependent mortality risk. This is because while a more progressive benefit-earnings rule provides increased insurance for households with relatively unfavorable earnings histories, and therefore lower savings and survivorship, their relatively high mortality risk heavily discounts the utility from old-age consumption. I find that these two effects roughly offset each other, yielding nearly identical optimal benefit-earnings rules both with and without differential mortality. JEL Classification Codes: E21, E62, H55

Because they ignore the household-level and macroeconomic adjustments associated with longevity improvements, the actuarial projections of the Social Security Administration overestimate the Social Security crisis. Using a general-equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets, I show that accounting for these adjustments, a significantly smaller decline in benefits is needed to balance the Social Security budget. Households respond to the longevity improvements by delaying retirement and Social Security benefit collection, working more hours, and by also saving more. In general equilibrium, these effects lead to a natural expansion of Social Security's tax base and generate significant delayed retirement credits, which the actuarial estimates completely overlook.JEL Classifications: E21, H55, J22

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