In 2018, the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo approved the Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers, setting up the foundations of the whistleblower protection system for the public and private sectors in the country. In line with the international principles for drafting legislation for the protection of whistleblowers, the law provides three channels for reporting wrongdoing and grants protection against any form of retaliation for whistleblowers. Noting the absence of institutional data on whistleblowing in the public sector, for this research article, a survey was implemented with individual members of civil service in Kosovo (n=400), during the period from September to November 2019, to collect primary data related to factors incentivizing and / or discouraging the decision to whistleblow. Data were collected at the national and local levels of state administration, as per the scope of the definition of the civil service by Kosovo legislation. In this contribution, research results reveal that the protection against any form of retaliation guaranteed by the law is not sufficient for members of civil service in Kosovo to support the decision to whistleblow, as concerns arise for the security and physical integrity of their respective family members. Law does not provide financial incentives for civil servants to whistleblow. Data reveal that a satisfactory level of trust is missing on organizational indicators such as trust in the responsible officer, protection of data confidentiality and anonymity, across different levels of categories of civil service. In line with the concerns voiced by members of civil service and international standards for whistleblower protection, the following actionable recommendations are proposed to advance the whistleblowing system in Kosovo: 1) Improve the provision of training for members of civil service on whistleblowing legislation, organizational procedures, whistleblower protection, and rights; 2) Establish strategies to support employees for whistleblowing. Such strategies would include programs enabling whistleblowers access to professional services such as stress management, counseling, and legal services; 3) Enhance security measures for the physical integrity of whistleblowers and their respective family members; 4) Establish incentives to encourage whistleblowing, such as financial rewards.

Many international organisations have recently acknowledged the significance of whistleblowing in preventing institutional corruption, particularly in the public sector. Likewise, many countries have enacted whistleblower protection laws, though a robust whistleblower protection system certainly requires much more than legislation. One challenge in developing effective protection systems is finding empirical evidence to evaluate existing systems. Can we measure the effectiveness of whistleblower protection systems accross different countries? What conditions do we need to make the whistleblower protection system work effectively in the public sector? This paper investigates two cases: South Korea and the Republic of Kosovo. South Korean data comes from the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of South Korea, while its counterpart from Kosovo comes from a survey of 400 public officials about whistleblower protection. By analysing both datasets, this paper creates a new index that evaluates the effectiveness of whistleblower protection. Composed of quantitative and qualitative sub-indices, the index serves as a digital comparison tool for assessing whistleblower protection systems across different countries and at different times. In addition to enacting high-quality laws, this index identifies several additional measures that can strengthen whistleblower protection systems in the public sector.