No abstract

A simulation study demonstrates the influence of perceived justice of a tax amnesty on subsequent tax compliance. In addition, it investigates how the amnesty is perceived to serve the punishment objectives retribution (i.e., giving offenders what they "deserve") and value restoration (i.e., restoring the values violated by tax evasion). Hierarchical regression analysis revealed the expected positive influence of justice on subsequent tax compliance. However, when the influence of punishment objectives was controlled for, the influence of justice disappeared, while retribution and value restoration showed positive effects on post-amnesty tax compliance.

In a representative UK study (N = 1000) the link between distributive fairness perceptions, outcome favorability, identity, and tax compliance was researched in the context of European transfer payments. Results showed that both forms of tax compliance (i.e., individual and collective EU-tax compliance) were influenced by perceived distributive fairness judgments of EU transfer payments. Fairness itself was related to perceived outcome favorability (i.e., whether their own nation benefits from the EU in financial as well as socio-political terms). Additionally, national identifiers (i.e., people identifying with their own nation, but not with Europe) perceived EU membership as unbeneficial in financial as well as in socio-political terms and thus considered the transfer payments as less fair. Dual identifiers (i.e., people identifying with their own nation and with Europe) perceived the socio-political outcomes from EU membership as more beneficial and thus evaluated the transfer payments as fairer.

One of the mandatory responsibilities of each citizen is paying taxes. Even though it is a legal requirement to do it, citizens have the possibility to adjust their payments and cheat on it. Thus, the paying of taxes can be seen as cooperative act between the state and its citizens. Based on the group engagement model of cooperation, this study (N=474) demonstrates the interplay of perceived justice, national identification, motivational postures and tax compliance. Extending the justice dimensions of the original group engagement model by retributive justice, a positive relationship of all three forms of perceived justice (i.e. procedural justice, resource judgements, and justice of punishment) with national identification was achieved. Furthermore, while national identification was positively associated with deference, its negative association with defiance could not be shown. Tax compliance was high in case of strong attitudes of deference and weak attitudes of defiance. Results indicate partial mediation of justice judgments and deference through national identification. Judging justice is not an easy task and thus, citizens should be taught about the rationale behind tax law. Understanding the reasons for the law facilitates making up one’s mind regarding the fairness of tax distribution, tax procedures and retribution for cheating on taxes that influences tax compliance in the long run.

The present research compared a distributive fairness model of EU transfer payments (Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & Wenzel, 2011) between three countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, and the UK. The model postulates an interplay between EU‐tax compliance, distributive fairness, outcome favorability as well as national and European identification. Results across countries showed that EU‐tax compliance was positively related to distributive justice, which was in turn related to outcome favorability and identification. National identifiers perceived EU membership as unfavorable in financial and socio‐political terms, and thus considered the transfer payments as less fair. Dual identifiers perceived the socio‐political outcomes as more favorable, and thus evaluated the transfer payments as fairer. Although the basic structure of the model was valid across all three countries, two country‐specific results were found. First, in the UK individual tax paying behavior was influenced by outcome favorability, whereas in Austria and the Czech Republic this relationship was mediated via distributive fairness. Second, in the Austrian sample, the differentiation between patriots and nationalists proved fruitful since nationalists considered the EU transfer payments as unfair, unlike patriots. In the UK and the Czech Republic the distinction between nationalists and patriots did not add any further information.