Soviet policy toward the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from 1943 to 1948 exemplified Josif Stalin's complicated relationship with the West European Communist parties and Western Europe in general. For a considerable while, Stalin insisted that the PCI follow a policy of moderation. Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, heeded Stalin's orders and tried to ensure that the Italian Communists pursued a policy of national unity and avoided conflicts that might lead to civil war in Italy. But this moderate approach collapsed after the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan in 1947 and thereby forced the West European Communist parties into extra-parliamentary opposition. Not until after the poor showing of the PCI in the 1948 Italian elections was the party able to regain a viable role. Stalin's conflicting advice to the PCI was indicative of his tenuous grasp of the situation in Western Europe.

Em seu trabalho dedicado ao Império Russo, Dominic Lieven enfatiza a exigência de "colocar a história da Rússia em seu contexto internacional", na crença de que, mais do que qualquer outro fator, os desafios da política de potên-cia "foram de preponderante importância na história russa", compreendido o período soviético. O lugar da Rússia na "mutável constelação européia e global do poder" aparece assim como o núcleo central de uma reconstrução voltada para colocar o próprio episódio da União Soviética no quadro da ascensão e da queda de uma potência imperial na presença dos seus "rivais", resolvendo com essa chave o problema histórico da continuidade com o passado czarista (Lieven, 2000). O estudo de Lieven contribuiu, entre outras coisas, para introduzir a noção de "império soviético", usada antes de 1991 de forma esporádica e freqüentemente rejeitada por meros motivos políticos, no debate histórico que nos anos mais recentes apresenta um interesse renovado em torno do tema do império. A apro-* Tradução de Arlete Dialetachi.

Reform Communism silvio pons and michele di donato What Was "Reform Communism"? Communists never used the notion of "reform communism." From World War I, their identity was built in opposition to "revisionist" tendencies among the socialist parties. They used the term "reformism" as a negative label and a synonym of right-wing "degeneration." Right up to 1989 their political culture upheld Marxist revolutionary references as a way to differentiate themselves from social democracy. Nevertheless, the lexicon and practices of a reform approach did emerge in the communist world after the death of Stalin. In the Soviet Union and in Europe, de-Stalinization and "peaceful coexistence" implied a change that could be interpreted in different ways, but clearly leaned toward gradualism and nonviolent transformation more than revolutionary thrusts. Although far-reaching ideas of reform were rapidly shelved, prospects of peaceful change still left their trace among communists, and ideas inspired by "socialist humanism" did not simply disappear. This legacy was most evident among the Czechoslovak reformers who led the Prague Spring of 1968, which would rapidly turn into a founding myth for "socialism with a human face." Its repression after the Soviet-led intervention of August 1968 represented a lasting shock for those who held hopes of democratic renewal, leading many East European reformers to embrace dissent and oppositioneven though reformist tendencies did also survive in some establishment circles. Defeated in the East, the ideas of reform communism found new focus on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In Western and Southern Europe, Eurocommunism emerged in the mid 1970s as a movement aimed at defending the legacy of the Prague Spring, assuming human rights as a component of socialist ideals, offering

Western communists reflected two opposing responses to the final crisis of communism that had matured over time. The French communists represented a conservative response increasingly hostile to Gorbachev's perestroika, while the Italians were supporters of a reformist response in time with his call for change. Thus Gorbachev was the chief reference, positive or negative, against which Western communists measured their own politics and identity. In 1989 the French aligned with the conservative communist leaderships of eastern Europe, and ended up opposing Gorbachev after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Accordingly, the PCF became a residual entity of traditional communism. On the other hand, the Italian communists agreed with all Gorbachev's choices, mid to some extent they even inspired his radical evolution. But they also shared Gorbachev's illusions, including the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall would produce a renewal of socialism in Europe. Unlike the PCF, the PCI was able to undertake change in the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, thus standing as a significant 'post-communist' force. However, if conservative communism was destined to become marginal, reform communism also failed in its objective of renewing the Soviet system and the communist political cultur

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