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Ethiopia had revolutions in 1974 and 1991, after which the Provisional Military Administration Council (‘PMAC’) and Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (‘EPRDF’) governments came to power, respectively. Each incoming government re-established and re-structured the courts. Likewise, criminal jurisdictions of the courts and the rules of appointment of judges and court personnel were changed. Yet, the governments presented the courts as independent, insulated from political interference. After examining the respective legislation and the decisions of two sets of courts, I argue that Ethiopia never had an independent judiciary; there were courts established for dispute settlement for the ordinary citizen. The courts were not as apolitical as claimed by the respective governments. They have been, often, compliant with the interests of the regime of the day by giving effect to the executive’s excesses of power or by creating enabling conditions, as though they were extension of the executive.

This article reviews the various theories of law applied throughout the modern development of the Ethiopian system of rules from a criminal law perspective. As is elsewhere, the initial influences mainly relate to the natural law theory. Later, positivisation evolved as part of the modernisation of law. Further, as part of the modernisation of society, the social theory of law evolved. With the PMAC coming to power, the Marxist theory of law crept in. The excessive connection between law and politics glamoured the instrumentality of the law. This got prominence in the post-2005 election in Ethiopia. The theories of law are abstracted from the manner the laws were designed, or the way they are implemented. The discussion looks into the difference between the statutes and the application of criminal law. Further, it shows that legal theory has a method aspect.  I finally argue for the pragmatic instrumentality of the law.

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