This study relies on environmental stewardship, a stakeholder enlarged view of stewardship theory, and institutional theory to analyze the relationship between CEO compensation and firms' environmental commitment in a worldwide sample of 520 large listed firms. Our findings show that environment friendly firms pay their CEOs less total compensation and rely less on incentive-based compensation than environment careless firms. This negative relationship is stronger in institutional contexts where national environmental regulations are weaker. Our findings have important theoretical meaning and practical implications. Results show that CEOs do not necessarily act opportunistically; rather some of them may be willing to act as stewards of the natural environment and accept a lower, less incentive-based, compensation from environment friendly firms. This study also provides evidence of the important influence of the institutional context in setting-up CEO compensation as the relationship is stronger when national environmental regulations are weaker.Our findings question the universal validity of agency theory in explaining CEO compensation.Compensation based on pecuniary incentives might be less indicated to motivate CEOs who feel rewarded by playing a stewardship role for environment friendly firms. When designing compensation for CEOs, compensation committees and external compensation advisors should consider psychological and institutional factors that might affect CEO motivation.

After long-term follow-up, the incidence of TSH following LC was higher than expected. The insertion of large trocars at the umbilical site plays a key role in the development of TSH. Other conditions such as obesity and large gallstones can be additional risk factors since the umbilical defect must often be widened in these cases.

Impression management and retrospective sense-making in corporate annual reports:banks' graphical reporting during the global financial crisis Abstract:This study investigates two potentially complementary reporting scenarios in annual reports: reactive impression management and retrospective sense-making. It examines stock market performance graphs in European listed banks' annual reports before and during the global financial crisis. Our results indicate that banks reacted to the global financial crisis by omitting stock market performance graphs from the annual report and from its most prominent sections. On the other hand, banks reduced favourable distortions and favourable performance comparisons. No significant evidence of retrospective sense-making is found. Overall, the findings are consistent with impression management incorporating human cognitive biases, with companies preferring misrepresentation by omission over misrepresentation by commission. Under high public scrutiny, banks appear to seek to provide a more favourable view by concealing negative information, rather than by favourable distortions or comparisons. The study contributes to the development of impression management theories. It uses a psychological interpretation that incorporates human cognitive biases, rather than adopting a purely economically-based perspective.

If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.*Related content and download information correct at time of download. Does Graphical Reporting Improve Risk Disclosure? Evidence from European BanksPurpose: This study examines the voluntary disclosure of risk-related issues, with a focus on credit risk, in graphical reporting for listed banks in the major European economies. It aims to understand if banks portray credit risk-related information in graphs accurately and whether these graphs provide incremental, rather than replicative, information. It also investigates whether credit risk-related graphs provide a fair representation of risk performance or a more favourable impression than is warranted.Design/Methodology/Approach: A graphical accuracy index was constructed. Incremental information was measured. A multi-level linear model investigated whether credit risk affects the quantity and quality of graphical credit risk disclosure.Findings: Banks used credit risk graphs to provide incremental information. They were also selective, with riskier banks less likely to use risk graphs. Banks were accurate in their graphical reporting, particularly those with high levels of credit risk. These findings can be explained within an impression management perspective taking into account human cognitive biases. Preparers of risk graphs seem to prefer selective omission over obfuscation via inaccuracy. This probably reflects the fact that individuals, and by implication annual report's users, generally judge the provision of inaccurate information more harshly than the omission of unfavourable information. Research limitations/implications:This study provides theoretical insights by pointing out the limitations of a purely economics-based agency theory approach to impression management. Practical implications:The study suggests annual reports' readers need to be careful about subtle forms of impression management, such as those exploiting their cognitive bias. Regulatory and professional bodies should develop guidelines to ensure neutral and comparable graphical disclosure.Originality/Value: This study provides a substantive alternative to the predominant economic perspective on impression management in corporate reporting, by incorporating ...

This article investigates whether and how the demand for information at country and firm levels affects the selective use of key performance indicators graphs in corporate annual reports. Our study finds that the country-level and firm-level demands for information provide an incentive, rather than a curb, for a selective display of key performance indicators, which is an important concern in corporate communication and reporting. The external pressure from the demand for information seems to encourage, rather than discourage, impression management. We suggest that annual report readers should use graphical information with caution as companies are likely to provide a self-serving, nonneutral, account of their performance in those contexts where the pressure to perform is higher.