The advent of byte-addressable non-volatile memory technologies such as phase change memory (PCM) has spurred a flurry of research on topics including consistency and durability of data structures across power failures and optimizing systems for the low-latency nature of these technologies, while typically aiming to increase lifetime and reduce power consumption by reducing the number of writes to the non-volatile memory. However, in technologies such as PCM, it is bit flips that consume power and wear out cells, not writes. Thus, PCM controllers do not rewrite cells unless the cell changes value. However, this crucial optimization, reducing the number of bits flipped, has not been sufficiently explored for the rest of the hardware and software stack. We develop a framework for using the number of bit flips as the measure of "goodness" for a range of hardware and software techniques. We also introduce several simple and straightforward modifications to existing data structures that can reduce the number of bit flips over time, and profile use cases in which the approach with the fewest writes does not also minimize bit flips. Based on these findings, we discuss potential approaches that can further minimize bit flips, better optimizing hardware and software for non-volatile memory technologies such as PCM.
Increasingly, archival systems are relying on authentication-based techniques that leverage secret-splitting rather than encryption to secure data for long-term storage. Secret-splitting data across multiple independent repositories reduces complexities in key management, eliminates the need for updates due to encryption algorithm deprecation over time, and reduces the risk of insider compromise. While reconstruction of stored data objects is straightforward if a user-maintained index is available, the system must also support disaster recovery incase the index is unavailable. Designing a mechanism for efficient index-free reconstruction, that does not increase the risk of attacker compromise, is a challenge. Reconstruction requires the association of chunks that make up an object, which is the kind of information attackers can use to identify chunks they must steal to illicitly obtain data.We propose two new techniques, the set-subset reconstruction and secret-split secure hash (S3H) reconstruction, which allow chunks of data to be correlated and quickly reconstructed without providing useful information to an attacker. Both techniques operate on the entire collections of secret-split chunks in the archive. While they can efficiently rebuild an entire archive, they are inefficient and impractical for rebuilding single objects, making them useless for attackers that do not have access to all of the data. These techniques can each be tuned to trade-off between reconstruction performance and security, reducing overall runtime from O(N K ) (for N objects requiring K recombined chunks each to return the original object) to between O(N ) and O(N 2 ). These runtimes are practical for archives containing as many as 10 7 objects for the secret-split secure hash method and 10 9 objects for the set-subset method. Larger archives can run these techniques with manageable runtimes by grouping data into separate smaller collections and running the algorithms on each collection in parallel.
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