The use of political violence to attain political goals has long been a source of concern. Once thought to be exclusive to countries with high levels of general violence, recent evidence suggests that harassment and intimidation of political elites in the UK is more widespread than previously thought. Using data from the 2017 general election candidate survey, we find that four in every ten candidates experienced at least one type of harassment. Evidence suggests that women and young candidates are more likely to suffer from harassment and intimidation. We conclude by formulating an agenda for future research, focussing, in particular, on the perception of harassment and the effect of harassment on political careers.

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I n cr e a si n g t h e c o st of f e m al e r e pr e s e nt ati o n ? T h e g e n d er e d e ff e ct s of h ar a s s m e nt, a b u s e a n d i nti mi d ati o n t o w ar d s P arli a m e nt ar y c a n di d at e s i n t h e U K S o fi a C olli g n o n a a n d W olf g a n g R ü di g b a D e p art m e nt of P oliti cs, I nt er n ati o n al R el ati o ns a n d P hil os o p h y, R o y al H oll o w a y U ni v ersit y of L o n d o n, S urr e y, U K; b D e p art m e nt of P oliti cs, U ni v ersit y of Str at h cl y d e, Gl as g o w, U K © 2 0 2 1 T h e A ut h or(s). P u blis h e d b y I nf or m a U K Li mit e d, tr a di n g as T a yl or & Fr a n cis Gr o u p T his is a n O p e n A c c ess arti cl e distri b ut e d u n d er t h e t er ms of t h e Cr e ati v e C o m m o ns Attri b uti o n Li c e ns e ( htt p:// cr e ati v e c o m m o ns. or g/li c e ns es/ b y/ 4. 0/ ), w hi c h p er mits u nr estri ct e d us e, distri b uti o n, a n d r e pr o d u cti o n i n a n y m e di u m, pr o vi d e d t h e ori gi n al w or k is pr o p erl y cit e d.

Support for social distancing measures was, globally, high at the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic but increasingly came under pressure. Focusing on the UK, this article provides a rigorous exploration of the drivers of public support for social distancing at their formative stage, via mixed methods. Synthesizing insights from crisis management and securitization theory, thematic analysis is employed to map the main frames promoted by the government and other actors on the nature/severity, blame/responsibility, and appropriate response to the pandemic, which ‘follows the science’. The impact of these on public attitudes is examined via a series of regression analyses, drawing on a representative survey of the UK population (n = 2100). Findings challenge the prevailing understanding that support for measures is driven by personal health considerations, socio-economic circumstances, and political influences. Instead, crisis framing dynamics, which the government is well-positioned to dominate, have the greatest impact on driving public attitudes.

Previous empirical social science research on Covid-19 has mainly focused on predicting compliance with behavioural instructions in terms of demographics and socioeconomic determinants. In terms of political variables, trust in government and left-right political orientation has been a major focus of research. One aspect that so far appears to have been ignored is the attitudes of political elites and how they compare with the attitudes of those they represent. Based on a survey of local councillors and members of the public in England in the early phase of the lockdown, we can show that the UK government lockdown measures enjoyed overwhelming support among local elites as well as the general public. However, we can also find sources of lack of support and consensus even at this early stage: While younger and male members of the public, as well as members of the LGBT community, were less enthusiastic about the lockdown, opposition among the public is mainly based on "populist" attitudes that became prominent in the Brexit debate such as evaluations of immigration and scepticism about climate change. These sources of dissent could be expected to become more prominent as the pandemic unravels.