This study explores the gap between policy rhetoric and the reality faced by Korean working mothers, by addressing the following question; whether and to what extent do policy measures for work–family balance contribute to positive work–family interface for working mothers? Although the Korean government has advocated a positive relation between state policy and satisfaction with work–family balance, this is not necessarily the case in practice. To this end, this study focuses on the relative contribution of policy measures to achieve work–family balance reported by working mothers, in relative to traditional gender stereotypes based on Confucian culture as well as working conditions. An empirical analysis with 1,082 Korean working mothers shows interesting findings. First of all, the contribution of policy towards the reported satisfaction in work–family balance is not supported, while the set of traditional gender stereotypes is found to be a negative contributor. Husbands’ psychological support for their wives’ employment, which seems to strengthen the impact of traditional gender stereotypes, follows. The implications of the findings are discussed in depth, by considering the relationships between policy outcomes and traditional gender stereotypes in Korea.

Despite their fear of repercussions on career advancement and gender identity, Korean fathers taking parental leave have continually increased. Why do Korean fathers take parental leave in spite of the risk of being stigmatized as less masculine and less ideal workers? Are they willing to be ‘ideological renegades' to be new involved fathers? In‐depth interviews with fathers who took parental leave provide interesting answers. Overall, taking parental leave does not make fathers become ideological renegades since it is mainly utilized in a manner that accommodates the work devotion schema, deviating from the formal policy objectives. This deviant utilization is encouraged and even valued by organizations. This may be part of a psychological contract between organizations and employees, ensuring that employees are dedicated to their career even during parental leave. Furthermore, beyond the legal eligibility of uptake, informal but powerful ‘organizational eligibility' such as high performance or their contribution to the organization, makes not only the likelihood but also the aftermath of taking up different across fathers. As a result, a hierarchy among fathers with class connotations emerges. This hierarchy among fathers, combined with the traditional gender hierarchy, may reinforce the masculine fabric of ideal workers as the norm.

This study is to explore the reality of gendered work time and its policy implications. With the dual-earner model of family, the amount and manner in which time is spent for paid work, as opposed to unpaid work, constructs gender relations in Korea. This article raises the following questions. What is the impact of exceptionally long working hours on gender relations in the workplace and the family in Korea? In terms of time spent, to what extent are there changes in the unquestioned exclusive care responsibility by women and traditional notions of fatherhood? To what extent has the Confucian dichotomy of public (workplace) and private (family) been altered, in terms of the workplace practice of long working hours? In doing so, this study applies quantitative and qualitative data from various sources. The findings show that, despite moving towards a dual-earner reality, the Confucian dichotomy of unpaid work and fatherhood is still tenacious. Furthermore, the practice of extremely long working hours provides a 'good' reason for a father's absence in unpaid work, which in turn reflects the Confucian fatherhood. Also, this prevents mothers from achieving fuller integration into the labour market. Given these findings, we can see that the practices of long working hours and Confucian traditions combine to generate a vicious circle of gender inequality in the labour market and the family. The policy implications of these practices are discussed.

This study explores the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of gender mainstreaming logic, paying special attention to women's bureaux in Korea. In response to international pressures for gender mainstreaming, the Korean government has established or relocated women's bureaux since the 1990s. At first glance, it appears that the government in Korea has been keen to integrate gender issues into the entire policy process. However, closer investigation draws a very different picture. Qualitative findings from interviews with civil servants in Korean women's bureaux show that the bureaux are characterised by 'institutionalised powerlessness' in terms of peripheral structural arrangements, visible and invisible resistance from inside and outside government bureaucracy, and a lack of staff commitment. Therefore, it is hard to draw the conclusion that gender mainstreaming via the systematisation of women's bureaux would ever go beyond symbolic gestures in Korea.

No abstract