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The market for mergers and takeovers, often referred to as the market for corporate control [Manne (1965)], has always attracted the attention of investors and researchers because takeovers represent corporate investment decisions on a scale several times larger than the normal, ongoing, growth‐maintaining capital outlays by the typical value‐maximising firm. Although the theoretical justifications for such corporate actions are reasonably well understood, the true motives for the mergers and the strategies adopted by acquiring firms to consummate them can be complex and diverse in scope. Corporate acquisitions can therefore have widespread effects on the wealth of various groups of agents involved in the market for corporate control.

The empirical evidence on mergers and takeovers indicates that positive gains due to mergers and takeovers ac‐crue almost entirely to the target firms. While average abnormal returns to target firms are invariably positive, returns to bidding firms are negative in case of mergers and not significantly different from zero in case of takeovers (see Jensen and Ruback [1983] and De and Mathur in this issue for a review of the empirical evidence). That acquiring firms should offer the shareholders of the target firms such handsome rewards and accept marginal returns for themselves is one of the unresolved problems in the context of mergers and takeovers.

We document frequency distribution of 4315 two-party, non-equity alliances undertaken by the U.S. based firms between 1986 and 2015 in 11industries and find that on an aggregate basis, the firms which form multiple alliances based on the exploitation motive are as likely to enter into alliance as the firms that enter into multiple alliances based on the exploration motive. However, we find strong evidence that the firms that enter into alliances on three or more occasions are driven by the exploration motive while, the firms that enter into alliances one and one or two times are driven by the exploitation motive.  The average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) for all of the three subsamples of firms that undertook one, one or two, and three or more alliances during the time period for this study are all positive but exhibit a declining trend.  Firms that are larger in terms of total assets engage more frequently in alliances than smaller firms.  Returns to firms that enter into three or more alliances are sensitive to the leverage employed and the likelihood of bankruptcy whereas returns to firms that enter into only one or one or two alliances are affected significantly by the considerations of competitive forces.