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Early formal models in Post-Keynesian macroeconomics included an investment function (Rowthorn, 1981) or conflict inflation (Rowthorn, 1977), but the dynamics of these two processes were not analyzed together in a single model. More recently, a class of models emerged which brings both these lines of literature together by proposing a model of conflict inflation with Kaleckian investment function (see, for instance e.g., Cassetti, 2002Cassetti, , 2003. However, as Skott and Zipperer (2012) points out, these models suffer from an important limitation: the bargaining power of workers is dependent either on the degree of capacity utilization or on the rate of growth of employment, but not on the the rate of employment. In other words, many of these models do not explicitly account for the process through which the supply of labor adjusts to its demand, either through migration or through changes in labor productivity. The actual process through which this adjustment takes place, and the impact of this on

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We use a simple general model of interactive dynamics between the COVID-19 pandemic and the economy to examine the impact of various nonpharmaceutical interventions in the form of restrictions on socio-economic activities like lockdowns, travel restrictions, etc. We mathematically demonstrate that these restrictions might be useful in preventing repeated waves of infection recurrence in the pandemic. These results are general and not dependent on choice of specific functional forms or parameter configurations. We set out briefly the implications of these results for public health interventions.

The paper introduces the financial sector in a standard multiplier-accelerator framework by incorporating financial variables in the investment function. The resultant equation is similar in form to that of a logistic map, and hence behaves unpredictably under certain values of the parameters. Since monetary authorities have a large influence on many of these parameters, monetary policies are effective in both controlling investment and preventing or postponing a financial crisis. The monetary authorities, however, are also keen to play an additional role of keeping the system predictable. Under certain conditions, there could be a conflict between these two objectives-of preventing a financial crisis and keeping the system predictable.