Most of the online news media outlets rely heavily on the revenues generated from the clicks made by their readers, and due to the presence of numerous such outlets, they need to compete with each other for reader attention. To attract the readers to click on an article and subsequently visit the media site, the outlets often come up with catchy headlines accompanying the article links, which lure the readers to click on the link. Such headlines are known as Clickbaits. While these baits may trick the readers into clicking, in the longrun, clickbaits usually don't live up to the expectation of the readers, and leave them disappointed.In this work, we attempt to automatically detect clickbaits and then build a browser extension which warns the readers of different media sites about the possibility of being baited by such headlines. The extension also offers each reader an option to block clickbaits she doesn't want to see. Then, using such reader choices, the extension automatically blocks similar clickbaits during her future visits. We run extensive offline and online experiments across multiple media sites and find that the proposed clickbait detection and the personalized blocking approaches perform very well achieving 93% accuracy in detecting and 89% accuracy in blocking clickbaits.2. newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/08/news-feed-fyi-click-baiting 3. thenextweb.com/facebook/2016/04/21/facebook-might-finally-killclickbait-new-algorithm-tweaks/

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This work presents practical key-recovery attacks on round-reduced variants of CAESAR Round 2 candidate PAEQ by analyzing it in the light of guess-anddetermine analysis. The attack developed here targets the mode of operation along with diffusion inside the AES based internal permutation AESQ. The first attack uses a guess-and-invert technique leading to a meet-in-themiddle attack that is able to recover the key for 6 out of the 20 rounds of paeq-64/80/128 with reduced key entropy of 1, 2 16 and 2 32 , respectively. The second analysis extends the attack to 7 rounds using a invert-and-guess strategy which results in reduced key space of 2 24 , 2 32 , and 2 40 for the same PAEQ variants. Then, an 8-round attack (without the last shuffle operation) is mounted using a guess-invert-guess strategy which works on any of the three variants with a complexity of 2 48 . Moreover, unlike the CICO attack mounted by the designers which works with only AESQ, our 8-round attack additionally takes into account the mode of operation of PAEQ. Finally, combining

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