No abstract

No abstract

This article examines the role of external inspection in enhancing the quality of a criminal justice system. It seeks to answer six foundational questions: how should we understand the nature and purposes of criminal justice inspection? what methodologies ought it to employ? who should do it? what values should it respect? how much does it cost? and does it 'work'? The article reveals that the difference between inspection and other forms of scrutiny activity is largely a matter of emphasis; that the same is true of the difference between inspection and research; that 'lay' involvement in inspection can be beneficial; that independence is a core value for inspection, albeit one that is best understood as independence of judgement; that transparency is a further key value but not always honoured; and that evidence that inspection improves service delivery and hence justifies its costs is weak and further research is needed.

Most recent discussion of the provocation defence has focused on the objective test, and little attention has been paid to the subjective test. However, the subjective test provides a substantial constraint: the killing must result from a provocation that undermines the defendant's self-control. The idea of loss of selfcontrol has been developed in both the philosophical and psychological literatures. Understanding the subjective test in the light of the conception developed there makes for a far more coherent interpretation of the provocation defence. It also makes clear just how radical various proposals for reform of the defence would be.-3-THE SUBJECTIVE TEST WITHIN THE CLASSIC DEFINITION In English law, provocation remains a common law defence. 6 If we are to understand its structure, therefore, we must look to case law for assistance. The first port of call is the so-called 'classic definition' 7 of provocation in R v Duffy. There Devlin J (as he then was) described provocation as: some act, or series of acts, done [or words spoken] ... which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind. 8 Devlin J's statement places loss of self-control firmly at the heart of the provocation defence, a view given legislative force by section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957. 9 It also expands upon the notion of loss of self-control by adding two adjectives-'sudden' and 'temporary'-to the definition. This raises three questions that will be at the heart of our account: (i) what is self-control? (ii) what do we mean when we speak of someone losing their self-control, and what characteristics do they display? and (iii) what difference, if any, is made to the scope of the provocation defence by the addition to the definition of the words 'sudden' and 'temporary'? self-control that is habitually undermined.

No abstract