This paper examines whether firms manipulating their reported financial results make suboptimal investment decisions. We examine fixed asset investments for a large sample of public companies during the 1978–2002 period and document that firms that manipulate their earnings—firms investigated by the SEC for accounting irregularities, firms sued by their shareholders for improper accounting, and firms that restated financial statements—over-invest substantially during the misreporting period. Furthermore, following the misreporting period, these firms no longer over-invest, consistent with corrected information leading to more efficient investment levels. We find similar patterns for firms with high discretionary revenues or accruals. Our findings suggest that earnings management, which is largely viewed as targeting parties external to the firm, can also influence internal decisions.

No abstract

No abstract

This study examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect simulated and actual earnings management. The results indicate that revenue models are less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. Using a simulation procedure, I find that revenue models are more likely than accrual models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Using a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense-related misstatements, I find that, although revenue models detect manipulation, accrual models do not. These findings provide support for using measures of discretionary revenues to study earnings management.

We find that equity returns associated with credit risk changes are attenuated by the debt value effect of the credit risk changes, as Merton (1974) predicts. We find that the relation between credit risk changes and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt—controlling for asset value changes, credit risk increases (decreases) are associated with equity value increases (decreases). This result obtains across credit risk levels. The relation is associated with changes in both expected cash flows and systematic risk, as reflected in analyst earnings forecasts and equity cost of capital. By inverting the Merton (1974) model, we provide descriptive evidence that if unrecognized debt value changes were recognized in income, but not unrecognized asset value changes, most credit upgrade (downgrade) firms would recognize lower (higher) income. These potentially counterintuitive income effects primarily are attributable to incomplete recognition of contemporaneous asset value changes. However, for a substantial majority of downgrade firms we find that recognized asset write-downs exceed unrecognized gains from debt value decreases. This mitigates concerns that income effects from recognizing changes in debt values would be anomalous for such firms.