Subjects were asked to rate the value and attractiveness of cookies that were either in abundant supply or scarce supply. In the scarce condition, the cookies were either constantly scarce or they began in abundant supply and then decreased. Subjects were told that this decrease in supply was cither due to an accident or to a high demand for the cookies. In the abundant condition, the cookies were either constantly abundant or first scarce and then abundant. The increase in supply was either due to an accident or to a lack of demand for the cookies. These conditions were crossed with a manipulation in which subjects thought either a high or low number of additional subjects were still to participate in the study. The results indicated that (a) cookies in scarce supply were rated as more desirable than cookies in abundant supply; (b) cookies were rated as more valuable when their supply changed from abundant to scarce than when they were constantly scarce; and (c) cookies scarce because of high demand were rated higher than cookies that were scarce because of an accident. With regard to abundance, cookies that were constantly abundant were rated higher than cookies that began scarce but later became abundant. The results were interpreted as extending commodity theory, and reactance was hypothesized as an intervening process responsible for some of the results. A second study was performed to rule out the possibility that demand characteristics were responsible for the obtained results.We are constantly bombarded by advertising aimed at increasing our desire to possess certain objects. In order to enhance the attractiveness of their product,, advertisers have used such gimmicks as pairing the object with a well-known figure, linking sex appeal to the object, or simply giving the "straight facts from controlled laboratory studies." Another effective method for selling the product is to suggest that it is scarce or in limited supply. Limited editions of cars, books, boats, stamps, and commemorative coins continually appear on the market, and the limited edition often costs as much as four times more than the everyday product.

The purpose of the present research was to show how social identity theory can be applied to enhance individual productivity within groups. Three experiments manipulated in-group identifiability and importance of the group for one's social identity, and compared individual's productivity when working alone to when working in a group setting. The group setting in the first study involved either a collective of unrelated individuals, a group of participants expecting future interaction, or a group working for a group reward. The second study compared productivity in groups with four differing interdependent reward structures. The final study examine the impact of group members wearing a common uniform (vs. no uniform) and the presence (or absence) of an out-group. Results supported the general prediction that group productivity would be enhanced by factors that increase group categorization and the importance of the group to members' social identities (future interaction, interdependent reward structure and uniform/outgroup present). However, productivity in groups was not influenced by perceptions of the task or identifiability of performance. These findings extent social identity theory by suggesting that group members will increase their in-group position through individual work efforts.

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A study was conducted to lost the proposition that countcrattitudinal advocacy docs not lead to the arousal of cognitive dissonance unless that advocacy results in undesirable consequences. As in the study by Festinger and Carlsmith, subjects in the experiment were asked to perform an extremely dull task. They then were offered varying incentives to tell a "waiting; subject" that the dull task was interesting and enjoyable. Half of the subjects learned that they bad succeeded in convincing their supposedly naive, unsuspecting colleague that the task would be interesting. The other half learned that their colleague still believed that the task would be dull. All subjects were then asked to evaluate the task. It was predicted that only the group of subjects who thought they had brought about the undesirable consequence of convincing the waiting subject that the task was interesting would demonstrate the dissonance-produced, inverse relationship between incentive magnitude and attitude change. The results supported the hypothesis: Only those subjects who complied for a small incentive, and succeeded in convincing the waiting subject, came to believe that the task was interesting. The implications of these findings for some of the recent revisions of dissonance theory are discussed.

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