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In many settings firms rely on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to certify prosocial attributes embodied in their products. We provide a model of competition between NGOs in the provision of labeling services. Competition between a fixed number of NGOs features a “race to the top” in labeling standards, but entry of NGOs offering new labels pushes standards down. In a wide range of settings NGO entry and competition results in too many labels being adopted, with each label being too stringent. Compared to a setting in which firms can credibly communicate the social attributes of their products, labels demand greater prosocial behavior than is desired by firms, although with proliferation of the number of labels this discrepancy disappears. In contrast to existing models, firms may engage in excessive corporate social responsibility when they rely on an NGO as a certifying intermediary. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

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The global economic value of parks through improved mental health of tourists has been estimated at about ten times greater than direct park tourism expenditure. The Chinese term for this health services value is jing hua xin ling , psychological destressing. Here we present the first case where optimal tourist infrastructure is influenced by including mental health. Using a multi-stage, cross-lingual, differential stakeholder method, we analyse conflicts between road- and roadless-access tourism in the very large new Sanjiangyuan National Park, Qinghai, which offers jing hua xin ling to domestic tourists from eastern-seaboard cities. This provides a powerful tourism attraction, and hence economic opportunity, for the region around the park. If these mental health aspects are included, together with their direct and indirect consequences for tourism, then roadlessness is preferable to new roads. Similar infrastructure conflicts occur for park tourism worldwide, and jing hua xin ling can provide a global theoretical framework.

Salience games : private politics when public attention is limited Article (Accepted Version) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Heyes, Anthony, Lyon, Thomas and Martin, Steve (2018) Salience games : private politics when public attention is limited. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 88. pp. 396-410.