The motivation for this paper is to investigate a previously unexplored exogenous shock to fiscal sustainability from economic policy uncertainty. To control for the impact of local government institutional and cultural factors on fiscal sustainability, we select data from 30 Chinese provinces for the 2012–2020 period for empirical analysis. We find that economic policy uncertainty shocks have a robust negative effect on fiscal sustainability after controlling for endogeneity. Economic policy uncertainty has an impact on fiscal sustainability mainly through the mediating variable of the social financing scale. To cope with the impact of uncertain economic policies, corporations reduce the scale of investment and financing, and residents have defensive savings motivations, reducing consumption and increasing savings. Therefore, economic policy uncertainty can lead to a reduction in the social financing scale. A reduction in the social financing scale can reduce government revenue and increase the debt scale. Ultimately, this leads to a decrease in the fiscal sustainability of local governments. This paper can provide a theoretical reference for reducing the negative impact of government policy adjustments and improving fiscal sustainability.

In the process of issuing and using local government debt, local officials may be corrupted by self-interest into inappropriately increasing the bond supply, leading to excessive expansion of local government debt and an increase in debt risk. Adopting the perspective of government investment efficiency, this paper employs a piecemeal causal steps approach to analyze the influence of local official corruption on local government debt. The results from panel data on 30 provinces in China show that the local official corruption triggers the expansion of local government debt. A mediation analysis reveals that the effect operates by impairing government investment efficiency. An analysis of regional heterogeneity further shows that the impact is weaker or even disappears in developed in comparison to underdeveloped regions, which further indicates that the anti-corruption campaign supports local government debt management, especially in developed regions. This paper not only explains the relationship between local official corruption and local government debt, but also provides new ideas for local government debt management.

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