Abstract. Power analysis attack is one of the most important and effective side channel attack methods, that has been attempted against implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of SIMON [5] and LED [16] lightweight block ciphers against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. Firstly, we describe the power model used to mount the attack on Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation of SIMON and LED block ciphers. Then, we proceed to experimentally verified DPA attack, which is the first successful DPA attack on the algorithms. Our attack retrieves complete 64-bit key of SIMON32/64 and LED-64 with a complexity of 176 and 218 hypotheses respectively. Finally, we present our analysis on other versions of SIMON and LED. Our DPA results exhibits the weakness of algorithms, which emphasize the need for secure implementation of SIMON and LED.

As Internet of Things (IoT) evolves very rapidly, security components (cryptographic algorithm, protocol) of embedded devices need to be secure against software and physical attacks. However, the performance factors namely speed, area, and power play a major role in selection of security components for a resource constrained embedded devices. Subsequently, cryptographers are more attentive on designing lightweight ciphers to protect the information in such devices. PRINCE [3] and RECTANGLE [18] lightweight block ciphers are proposed using new design strategies for efficiency and security. In this paper we analyse the security of PRINCE and RECTANGLE against a type of side-channel attack called Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attack. Our attack reduces key search space from 2 128 to 33008 for PRINCE and 2 80 to 288 for RECTANGLE.

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